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Abstract
A useful paradigm for investigating unconscious influences on performance
derives from the study of explicit (conscious) and implicit (imconscious)
memory, however direct andindirect tests used to measure these constructs are
seldom process pure, and it is problematic to make firm conclusions about
unconscious influences on the basis of these tests alone. Consequently, various
methodologies for separating out the respective influence of unconscious
processes have been devised. Two experiments are reported which employed a
levels ofprocessing (LOP) approach to manipulate encoding level at study and
a uruque method for accessing the effect ofunconscious influences ondirect test
performance by analysing the correctness of responses reported as "guessed."
Experiment 1 (n = 12) employed a direct (cued recall) test and was a
preliminary attempt to establish the validity of the "analysis of guessing
methodology. Experiment 2{n = 36) employed comparable direct (cued recall)
and indirect (stem completion) tests and investigated uncorrscious mfluences in
a more rigorous marmer by obtaining confidence ratings of recollection on a 5-
point scale and accepting only zero ratings as reliably guessed. Analysis of
correctly guessed responses showed that guessing stems of nonsemantically
processed words enhanced direct test performance whereas guessing stems of
semantically processed words had no affect on performance. Results are
discussed in terms of subjects' imwitting resourcefulness at being able to
"retrieve" words they cannot explicitly remember, and the advantage offered
by the analysis of guessing methodology over and above alternate methods for
measturing unconscious influences.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Respectability of unconscious processes as a topicfor
psychological research
Historically, the respectability of unconscious mental processes as a topic for
psychological investigation has waxed and waned. The concept is well-
grounded in psychodynamic theorising and, as such, prospered during the
early part of this century, only to be all but banished during the fuU flight of
behaviourism in the 1950's (Greenwald, 1992; Hdgard, 1992). However, it is
exceedingly difficult to argue convincingly against the existence of mental
processes ofwhich we are not aware. Strong anecdotal evidence has existed for
several thousand years (Whyte, 1960), some stemming from the very
beginnings of civilisation (Margetts, 1953, cited in Whyte, 1960). Moreover,
rmconscious processes or influences are implicitly considered "a general
metatheoretical assumption of almost all of contemporary cogiutive
psychology" (p. 796, Lewicki, Hill, &Czyzewska, 1992). In general, however,
researchers have been reluctant to make these metatheoretical assumptions
explicit, and the study of imconscious influences in the information processing
sequence has consequently suffered considerable neglect.
The last decade, however, has witnessed a gradual ascendance of
imconscious processes as a respectable and valid research topic, especially
within the fields of information processing, cognitive psychology, cognitive
neuropsychology, and linguistics (Reber, 1985). This change is largely due to
the cumulative effects of a few innovative and momentous research efforts that
have taken place within the last 50 years.
Historical context of contemporary research
The orientation toward unconscious processes this century has had a
predominantly psychoanalytic flavour, the historic development of which has
been extensively detailed by White (1960) and Ellenberger (1970). Freud freely
adopted the metaphor of Fechner and compared the psyche to an iceberg, the
underwater (unconscious) portion of which comprised a storehouse of urges,
needs, wishes, repressed ideas, and other vital forces which exercised supreme
control over all (conscious) behaviour (Hall & Lindzey, 1957). Thus, for Freud,
the unconscious, having central importance in the life of the individual, simply
should not be omitted from any complete psychology.
Non-Freudian twentieth century efforts at investigating unconscious
processes have been described by Greenwald (1992) as a series of "New Looks"
(see also Erdelyi, 1974). New Look 1 originated with the early work of Bruner
and Postman (e.g., Bruner & Postman, 1947) which itself had little to do with
distinctions between conscious and unconscious processes. The relevance of
this work was that it experimentally addressed perception from a constructivist
standpoint by arguing against the positivist notion of "pure perception," or a
one to one mapping of reality, in favour of the Bartlettian view that perception
is constructed out of available resources (e.g., memory, experience, interests,
attitudes, and other motivations, Bruner, 1992). Although the influence of New
Look 1 was substantial, it was also remarkably short lived (Greenwald, 1992).
New Look 2, according to Greenwald's (1992) formulation, began with the
work of Erdelyi (1974) which associated theoretically the psychodynamic
unconscious with cognitive psychology. According to Erdelyi (1992), all
constructivist viewpoints (Bartlettian, Freudian, or those of Bruner and
Postman) are dynamic and hence psychodynamic theories. However, Erdelyi
(1992) also argued that current investigations of imconscious processes need
not logically be connected with psychodynamic formulations and called for
some separation between the two.
Greenwald (1992) considers that current interest in unconscious processes
qualifies as New Look 3, characterised by its abandonment of the
psychodynamically oriented flavour of earlier New Looks for its focus on far
simpler "cognitively less sophisticated" (p. 766) events. Greenwald (1992)
argued that the time has come to accept that the study of unconscious processes
qualifies as respectable mainstream psychology. Moreover, Kihlstrom,
Bamhardt, and Tataryn (1992) consider that "after 100 years of neglect,
suspicion, and frustration, unconscious processes have now taken a firm hold
on the collective mind of psychologists" (p. 788).
Plan of study
This study aims to investigate the influence of unconscious processes on
the performance of acued recall (direct) memory test. Chapters 1to 5comprise
the literature review and Chapters 6 to 8 comprise the experimental
investigation and discussion of hypotheses which stem from the literature
review. A briefplan of eachchapter foUows.
Chapter 2reviews literature on issues of significance for the measurement
of unconscious influences, and establishes the conceptual unportance of direct
versus indirect tests, explicit versus unpUcit memory, and the utihty of the
memory ciissociation approach. The validity of dissociation research and
research on the measurement of unconscious influences is compromised,
however, if memory tasks thought to reveal unconscious influences are not
themselves process measures. The issue of process purity is ..explicitly
addressed in Chapter 3 by distinguishing memory tasks from memory processes,
and a review or relevant research establishes that performance on direct and
indirect tests of memory is influenced by both conscious and imconscious
processes.
One important imconscious influence on direct test performance may
occur when subjects guess the responses they cannot explicitly remember, and
Chapter 4 reviews current approaches for separating conscious and
unconscious influences and their utility for exploring this "informed guessing"
hypothesis. In Chapter 5, an alternate approach to the measurement of
unconscious influences on direct test performance is presented which shares
some similarities with existing methods but is also unique because it makes
iiunimal assumptions about the relationship between conscious and
unconscious processes and because it entails a direct analysis of guessed
responses. Chapters 6 comprises an experimental investigation into the
validity of this "analysis of guessing" method and Chapter 7 explores the
utility ofthis method ina more precise and elaborate manner. Finally, Chapter
8 provides a general discussion of the experimental findings including a
discussion of the strengths and limitations of the analysis of guessing method
in relation to other contemporary approaches that claim to measure
unconscious processes.
Chapter 2: Methods for exploring unconscious
influences
The indirect method
The ubiquity of unconscious mental processes (Lewicki et al., 1992)
contrasts markedly with our very liiiuted understanding of them. One of the
central problems remains their identification and measurement. Part of this
difficulty was foretold by Kant (1724-1804, cited in Whyte, 1960) who observed
that "onlywe canbe indirectly aware thatwehave a perception, though at the
same time we are not directly aware of it." Lewicki et al., (1992) provided a
twentiethcentury account of this problem: "whenresearchers attempt to learn
directly from subjects anything about how . . . judgments or decisions are
generated, subjects are usually as helpless as when they are asked to explain
how they identify right angles in three dimensional space or recognisepatterns.
All theyknow is they just do it" (my italics, p. 797). When researchers employ
procedures to investigate a subject's experience that are indirect, on the other
hand, more fruitful returns are often made. This is consistent with Marcel's
(1983) claim that "the most effective way to investigate unconscious
representations is to look at their influence rather than to require subjects to
utilize the representations selectively" (myitalics, p. 217).
Although cognitive psychologists have tended to distance themselves
from psychoanalytic formulations of vmconscious mental processes (Erdelyi,
1992; Greenwald, 1992), conceptually similar indirect procedures are used to
investigate unconscious processes by both camps Qacoby, Lindsay, & Toth,
1992). Because subjects cannot directly report rmconscious material,
psychoanalysts were among the first to devise strategies in an attempt to
"trick" a person into revealing this information. Such was the aim of various
projective techniques or devices which encouraged patients to "respond in an
unrestricted manner to unstructured or ambiguous objects or situations" (p.
581, Reber, 1985). Ambiguous images like those from Rorschach's ink blot
arrays (Rorschach, 1921/1963) are thought to encourage unconscious projection
in terms of one's own (concealed) desires, expectancies, and motives. Jacoby et
al. (1992) have drawn clear parallels between projective techruques such as the
Rorschach and more recent indirect investigations of unconscious processes
(see Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988). Thus, the rationale for using
projective methods appears to lie in their "indirectness;" these approaches
reveal unconscious information indirectly which is otherwise not consciously
reportable (Jacoby et al., 1992).
Direct and indirect tests of memory
The direct/indirect distinction has had its most substantial influence in the
study of conscious and unconscious forms of memory (see Hintzman, 1990;
Reingold & Merikle, 1990; Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). Direct tests
directly enquire about what memories are retained by, for example, asking
subjects to recall or otherwise explicitly remember prestudied material. Tests of
free recall, cued recall, and recognition are therefore held to be direct tests of
memory. Indirect tests, on the other hand, enquire indirectly about what
memories are retained by ensuring that retention is assessed as an incidental
feature of a task that ostensibly measures either something else or nothing at all
(Young & De Haan, 1992). For example, subjects might be instructed to
complete three letter stems of previously presented target words with the first
word that comes to mind under the guise that they are generating normative
data. Importantly, the distinction between a direct and indirect test of memory
is usually made on the basis of task instructions alone (Graf, Squire, &Mandler,
1984; Merikle & Reingold, 1991). That is, direct test instructions emphasise a
strong association between study and test but indirect test instructions do not.
In order to discuss the types of cognitive processes underlying performance on
direct and indirect tests of memory, it is important to address the conceptual
distinction between implicit and explicit memory which represents the most
substantive and successful paradigm this century for studying unconscious
processes.
Explicit and implicit memory
Pivotal in the study of unconscious processes has been the substantial
change in the direction ofmemory research in the last 15 years, typified by the
conceptual distinction between explicit and implicit memory (Graf & Schacter,
1985; Schacter, 1987). This paradigm had its origins in the 1960's and early
1970's with the work of Milner (1966) and Warrington and Weiskrantz, (1970,
see Shimamura, 1986, for a review) who studied memory in clinical
(anterograde anmesic) populations. This early research distinguished between
a type of declarative memory which utilised the conscious record of an event
and a type of nondeclarative memory which apparently did not require a
conscious record (Kandel & Hawkins, 1992).
Explicit memory is typically tested by a direct test whichinstructssubjects
to explicitly remember items from a listofpreviously studied words or objects.
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Successful performance is thought to require the intentional or conscious
recollection of the previous study episode and its contents. Most memory
research thiscenturyhas utilised theexplicit approach via direct tests (Schacter,
Chiu, •& Ochsner, 1993). Implicit memory, by contrast, is tested incidentally and.-
indirectly by looking for savings in or the facilitation of indirect test
performance usually following a study episode. Importantly, a subject is not
required to explicitly remember, and may even be unable to recall anything
whatsoever about the study episode and its contents. Thus, implicit memory
effects have been reported for subjects presented with study items during sleep
(Wood, Bootzin, Kihlstrom, & Schacter, 1992), whilst surgically anaesthetised
(Kihlstrom, Schacter, Cork, Hurt, &Behr, 1990), and even during one phase of
the alter ego in patients with multiple personality disorder, when tested in
another phase (Schacter & Kihlstrom, 1989, cited in Kihlstrom et al., 1992).
Therefore, implicit memory performance is thought to reveal unintentional or
unconscious influences with little or no conscious involvement.
Several types of implicit memory phenomena have been reported in the
literature for both neurologically impaired and normal populations. Among
impaired populations, implicit memory has been demonstrated for subjects
with anterograde amnesia, aphasia, blindsight, dyslexia, hemineglect, and
prosopagnosia (see Schacter, McAndrews, &Moscovitch, 1988; Milner &Rugg,
1992). Among normal populations, by far the most thoroughly investigated
type of implicit memory is that of repetition or direct priming in which the
presentation of study or target items facilitates their later identification when
degraded perceptual cues are provided with indirect instructions at test
11
(Schacter et al., 1993). Most research on priming has used visually presented
verbal material as stimuli (e.g., Jacoby &Dallas, 1981), although primingeffects
with nonverbal material (e.g., Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970) and auditory
material (e.g., Eich, 1984) have also been extensively investigated (see Schacter,
1987; Schacter et al., 1993 for reviews). Some of the most common verbal
indirect tests for assessing implicit memory by priming include stem
completion (e.g., Graf &Mandler, 1984), fragment completion (e.g., Roediger,
Weldon, Stadler, & Riegler, 1992), perceptual identification (e.g., Hashtroudi,
Ferguson, Rappold, &Chrosniak, 1988), and lexical decision (e.g., Moscovitch,
1982).
In the stem completion task, which is the method for assessing
unconscious or implicit memory in the present study, the first three letters of
prestudied words are presented at test and subjects are required to complete
the word stem with the first fitting word that comes to mind. Thus, for
presentation of the word "CASTLE" at study, implicit memory in the form of
priming would be indicated if, after presentation of the stem "CAS " at test
with indirect instructions, correct completion performance was significantly
better than chance. Chance level performance is estimated as the proportion of
word stems belonging to a distractor list, which is not shown to subjects at
study, that arealso "correctly" completed bychance alone.
In the present study, the direct/indirect distinction wiU be exclusively
adopted to describe memory tests, whereas the terms implicit (imconscious)
and explicit (conscious) will be reserved for describing memory procedures or
processes thatareintended tobeevoked by direct and indirect tests.
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The dissociation approach
Extensive investigation of implicit and explicit memory over the last
decade has revealed many empirical dissociations between performance on
direct and indirect tests. In the words of Olton (1989), "dissociations to the
memory researcher are what fruit flies are to the geneticist: a convenient
medium through which the phenomena and processes of interest can be
explored and elucidated" (p. 161). Consequently, much explanatory theorising
and speculation has arisen in an attempt to explain functional dissociations in
terms of different underlying processes and/or different neurological memory
systems (see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger, 1990; Roediger &
McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 1987; Schacter et al., 1993; Shimamura, 1986).
In memory research, at least five categories of information have provided
evidence for dissociations (cf. Hashtroudi, et al., 1988): (i) evidence that
performance on indirect tests may be statistically (stochastically) independent
of performance on direct tests (e.g., Tulving, Schacter, &• Stark, 1982, but see
Greene, 1986 for a negative finding), (ii) clinical evidence that anmesic subjects
and other neurologically or psychiatrically impaired subjects exhibit preserved
indirect test performance but severely compromised direct test performance
(see Schacter & Kihlstrom, 1989; Schacter, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 1988;
Shimamura, 1986), (iii) evidence that drugs (e.g., diazepam) have differential
effects on indirect and direct test performance (e.g., Danion, Zimmermann,
Willard-Schroeder, Grange, Welsch, Imbs, & Singer, 1990), (iv) evidence that
direct and indirect test performance is associated with different patterns of
event-related-potentials (see Squire, Knowlton & Musen, 1993), and (v)
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evidence that specific experimental manipulations have differential effects on
indirect and direct testperformance (see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). It
is this latter category which is ofinterest in thepresent study.
Levels ofprocessing
One well-established experimental manipulation for dissociating
performance on direct and indirect tests involves depth or level of processing
(LOP) or encoding of target material at study. Craik and Lockhart (1972; Craik
&Tulving, 1975) were the first to show the now ubiquitous effect that deep or
semantic processing at study (e.g., rating meaningfulness, likability, or
pleasantness of words) elicits considerably higher performance on direct tests
than does shallow, physical, or nonsemantic processing (e.g., determining case,
counting vowels, or enclosed spaces in words). In contrast to this finding for
explicit memory, however, it is now clear that LOP manipulations tend to have
little or no effect on indirect test performance (e.g.. Bowers & Schacter, 1990;
Graf & Mandler, 1984; Graf & Ryan, 1990; Hashtroudi et al., 1988; Roediger et
al., 1992; Schacter & McGlynn, 1989), although Challis and Brodbeck (1992)
have shown that this is not always the case. (This issue is elaborated further in
the introduction to Experiment 2.)
LOP manipulations share conceptual similarity with other systematic
approaches used to vary encoding level or intensity, such as dividing attention
(e.g., Merikle & Reingold, 1991; Jacoby et al, 1993). Minimal processing at
study and (indirect) instructions thatdo not draw an association between study
and test phases are conducive to miriimising conscious retrieval processes and
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maximising the contribution of implicit or unconscious processes (Merikle &
Reingold, 1991). Conversely, semantic or deep processing at study and (direct)
instructions that draw an explicit association between study and test are
conducive to maximising the contribution of explicit or conscious processes
(Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Craik &Tulving, 1975). Because LOP manipulations
at study are useful for exploring dissociations between direct and indirect test
performances, the LOP approach will alsobe employed in the present study.
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Chapter 3: Memory tasks versus memory
processes
16
The heuristic value of the dissociation approach is compromised if tasks
used to argue for dissociation effects are not themselves process or factor pure
measures (Jacoby, 1991). This is because the dissociation approach, as it applies
to implicit memory, is implicitly grounded on the assumption that the
processes indexed by each test are uniform and independent from each other.
The issue of process purity also has important implications for the
measurement of component processes because with process impure tests we
carmot simply assume that direct tests exclusively evoke conscious processes
and that indirect tests exclusively evoke unconscious processes (Jacoby, 1991;
Jacoby, Lindsay, & Toth, 1992; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993; Joordens &
Merikle, 1993; Merikle & Reingold, 1991; Nelson, Schreiber, & McEvoy, 1992;
Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). This section distinguishes memory tasks
from memory processes and reviews evidence for the process impurity of both
direct and indirect test performance. Because, however, unconscious influences
on direct test performance is the primary focus of the present study, most
attention will be given to discussing the componentprocesses of direct tests.
Conscious influences on indirect test performance
A substantial criticism leveled at the study of unconscious processes is
that we can never be quite certain that subjectshave no awareness of the events
designated by researchers as unconscious (Eriksen, 1960; Holender, 1986).
Because target stimuli in implicit memory studies are presented for durations
that would normally permit clear conscious identification, should a subject's
attention be directed toward them, it is a reasonable hypothesis that conscious
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processes may contribute somewhat to overall performance. That is, complete
conscious identification (Holender, 1986) or partial identification based on
partial cues (Eriksen, 1960) may indeed "contaminate" indirect test
performance and artificially inflate any estimate ofunconscious influences.
In support of this view, several researchers have either theoretically or
empirically shown that indirect test performance is sometimes influenced by
intentional retrieval strategies (see Jacoby, 1991; Light & Singh, 1987; Reingold
& Merikle, 1990; Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Schacter, Bowers, &
Booker, 1989). Schacter et al. (1989), for example, used a LOP approach to
investigate the degree to which performance on an indirect test was
contaminated by conscious processes. These authors reported that when
subjects remained ignorant of the study-test relationship or where subjects
were told prior to test that some word stems could be completed with study
words but to respond with the first word that cam.e to mind anyway, no LOP
effect was obtained. Thus, these subjects apparently did precisely what they
were instructed to do. However, for subjects who "caught on" to the design of
the experiment, a significant LOP effect was found, with performance following
semantic processing better than performance following nonsemantic
processing. Schacter et al. (1989) argued that better performance on an indirect
test following semantic processing, which we know enhances intentional recall
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975), provides evidence for the
surreptitious use of conscious retrieval processes. This logic has come to be
known as the "retrieval intentionality criterion" which, if valid, provides some
basis for judging the process purity of an indirect test (Schacter et al., 1989).
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Unconscious influences on direct test performance
Although direct test performance is traditionally thought to demand
predominantly effortful conscious processes, recent evidence attests to the
marked process impurity direct tests (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al., 1992, 1993;
Joordens & Merikle, 1993; Nelson, et al., 1992). Research on recognition
memory, for example, a commonly used direct memory test (Richardson-
Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Schacter, 1987), supports this viewpoint. Mandler,
Pearlstone, and Koopmans (1969, see also Juola, Fischler, Wood, & Atkinson,
1971; Mandler, 1980) have convincingly demonstrated that a recognition
judgment is the conjoint result of dual processes: unconscious phenomenal
familiarity on the one hand and conscious retrieval processes on the other.
Furthermore, the experimental design of most direct tests is such that both
r
conscious and unconscious influences may operate in the same direction
enabling an overall facilitation of performance by both types of processing
(Jacoby et al., 1992).
From an evolutionary perspective, it makes sense to expect that all task
relevant resources are pooled and implemented when making a response, some
of which may be conscious and some of which may not be. Thus, unconscious
resources may be indexed by feelings of familiarity about prestudied material
(e.g., Mandler, 1990) or be demonstrated where subjects simply guess
responses they cannot explicitly remember (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1992; Merikle &
Reingold, 1991). If we rigorously define a guessed response as a response
made when no conscious information is available to guide responding, then
guessing can be said to reveal unconscious influences on overall performance
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when guessing leads to significantly better than chance responding. This type
of responding is not random as the term guessing may imply, but is in some
sense unconsciously guided such that responses give the appearance of being
informed. Investigating the role of "informed guessing" on direct test
performance is important because it addresses (i) the issue of the process purity
of direct tests and (ii) the unwitting resourcefulness of subjects at being able to
"retrieve" words they cannot explicitly remember.
Converging evidence from studies of subliminal perception, which is in
many ways comparable to implicit memory (Kihistrom, 1987), is consistent
with the view that guessing is a kind of indirect test for information rendered
subliminal (Dixon, 1971; see also Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990). Indeed,
instructions to guess defined the earliest subliminal perception test (Sidis,
1898), and several other subliminal perception studies involving guessing have
demonstrated similar findings (see Dixon, 1971) . More direct evidence comes
from a recent study by Gabrieli, Milberg, Keane, and Corkin (1990) which
showed that cued recall performance for the densely amnesic subject H.M. was,
in fact, better than for normal control subjects (33.3% versus 23.5%,
respectively). Because anterograde amnesics cannot explicitly remember study
items and have to guess all of their responses, this result shows that when no
conscious information is available to guide explicit retrieval and subjects guess,
a direct test can become a sensitive indirect measure of unconscious processes.
Nonsemantically processed information also leads to poor explicit
recollection for normal subjects (Craik & Tulving, 1975) which Graf, Mandler,
and Haden. (1982) have argued "mirrors" anterograde amnesia (p. 1244). Thus,
one might also expect informed guessing to contribute substantially to cued
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recall of nonsemantlcally processed information in normal subjects. Graf,
Squire, and Mandler (1984, Experiment 3) compared amnesic and amnesic
control subjects for cued recall performance and reported no difference for
nonsemantically processed words (39.6% versus 39.9%, respectively) but a
small difference for semantically processed words (57.7% versus 69.0%,
respectively). This result is consistent with the view that similar amounts of
informed guessing may be employed by both amnesic and normal subjects, at
least for completions of nonsemantically processed words. By in large,
however, the effect of LOP at study on informed guessing for normal subjects
remains an open question which warrants investigation. Clearly, amnesics do
benefit from unconscious informed guessing of both semantically and
nonsemantically processed information, but the influence of unconscious
processes on direct test performance for normal subjects is complicated because
we do not know which responses subjects guess and which responses they
remember. It is the empirical separation of conscious and unconscious
processes on direct test performance which is the focus of the following
chapter.
21
Chapter 4: Methods for measuring unconscious
influences
22
If the study of unconscious influences is to progress, either process pure
tests need to be devised or appropriate methods for assessing the differential
contribution of conscious and unconscious influences on performance need to
be implemented. This section reviews current approaches for their utility in
separating the respective influence of conscious and unconscious processes on
direct test performance.
Jacohy's (1991) process dissociation framework
One stream of research by Jacoby and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby, 1991;
Jacoby et al., 1992, 1993) has made use of a process dissociation framework with
inclusion and exclusion tests for separating out the respective influence of both
conscious and unconscious influences on memory performance. Exclusion tests
are those which place conscious and unconscious influences in opposition.
Thus, subjects in the exclusion condition are generally instructed to respond
with the first word that comes to rrvind, but to exclude words they remember
being previously shown. The rationale for this test is that it excludes any
conscious influences on performance, leaving an ostensibly process pure
measure of unconscious influences. Inclusion tasks, in contrast, are normal
direct tests which place conscious and imconscious influences in concert.
Subjects in an inclusion test condition are generally instructed to try to
remember words, but to write the first word that comes to mind if they cannot
remember. The rationale for this test is that overall performance is facilitated
by both conscious and unconscious influences.
The theory behind the process dissociation framework has led to the
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derivation of some simple equations to describe memory performance in terms
of conscious (C) and unconscious (U) influences. Thus, Jacoby (1991) argued
that the probability of a correct inclusion or direct test response is the sum of
the proportion of trials involving a conscious influence and the proportion of
trials involving an unconscious influence, minus the proportion of trials on
which both conscious and unconscious processes occur:
Inclusion = C + U - {U+ C) (a)
Similarly, exclusion performance is considered to reflect the proportion of trials
on which there is an unconscious influence minus the proportion of trials on
which both conscious and unconscious influences occur:
Exclusion = U - (U + C) (b)
By solving simultaneous equations, it is then possible to calculate the influence
of unconscious processes on direct test performance.
Although these equations have obvious outward appeal, there are
disadvantages, in using them for this purpose. One general criticism is that the
process dissociation framework assumes independence between conscious and
unconscious processes when there are, in fact, an infinite number of ways to
describe this relationship, ranging from complete independence to complete
dependence, and no basis for rejecting one method over another (Joordens &
Merikle, 1993). For example, Joordens and Merikle (1993) have provided an
equally tenable set of equations which assume complete overlap between
conscious and unconscious processes. A related but more specific criticism.
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however, is that the process dissociation approach implies that a subject's
recollective experience is either entirely present or entirely absent. That is,
subjects are forced to make a dichotomous yes/no choice about recollection in
the exclusion condition, from which unconscious influences in the direct test
condition are calculated. An alternative approach might seek confidence
ratings from subjects about their recollective experience and then adopt either a
conservative or stringent criterion for accepting responses as remembered or
not remembered.
Gardiner's (1988) "know-remember" approach
Another approach that has attempted to investigate unconscious
influences on direct test performance was demonstrated by Gardiner (1988)
who manipulated LOP at study and used recognitionas the direct test. In this
study, subjects were required, firstly, to indicate which study words they
recognised, and then to indicate which of these words they remembered the
appearance of in the study list ("R" words) and which they did not remember
the appearance of but nonetheless recognised or knew by some other means
("K" words). The criticcd result reported by Gardiner (1988) was a dissociation
between R and K words as a function of LOP. Gardiner (1988) then drew
parallels between R words and explicit processes, on the one hand, and K
words and implicit processes, on the other. Thus,.Gardiner (1988) interpreted
these results as revealing the influence of both implicit and explicit processes on
direct test performance.
It is important to note, however, that Gardiner's (1988) study addressed
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recognition memory which, as previously discussed, is now well-known to
involve both conscious and unconscious influences (Mandler, 1980; Mandler et
al., 1969; Juola et al, 1971). Unconscious influences on recall memory (the focus
of the present research) is a considerably more interesting finding because recall
has not traditionally been thought of as involving dual processes in the same
way that recognition has. In addition, Gardiner's (1988) conclusion that "R"
words correspond to explicit processes and "K" vyords correspond to implicit
processes may not be warranted. Although "R" words may stem from episodic
memory and hence reflect explicit or conscious processes, the argued
nonepisodic nature of "K" words does not imply their recognition was not also
based on explicit processes. The strength of this argument rests on the validity
of classifying "K" words as nonepisodic, yet in this experiment both "R" and
"K" words were first recognised before being classified as such. It is
problematic to draw conclusions about the influence of implicit or unconscious
processes without ensuring that conscious influences are completely absent (cf.
Schacter et al., 1989). As with the process dissociation approach, a confidence
rating scale of explicit recollection may also have been useful here.
Nelson, Schreiber, and McEvoy's (1992) PIER model
Nelson et al. (1992) defined implicit memories as "preexisting memories
acquired before the laboratory task in the hundreds of experiences that people
have with the same stimulus in different contexts" (p. 322). These authors
consider that these memories qualify as implicit because "subjects are typically
unaware of their activation during encoding and retrieval and because they are
26
unaware of the effects that these memories have on their performance" (p. 323).
Nelson et al. (1992) investigated the involvement of implicit processes in direct
tests by manipulating target and test-cue set size. Set size refers to the number
of associates which, as a result of experience, are linked to a particular stimulus.
Set size effects are observed when differences in memory performance are
found for large versus small target or cue stimulus sets. Generally, the larger
the target or cue set size, and hence the more preexisting associates, the lower
the probability of recall, and conversely, the smaller the set size, the greater the
probability of recall. Fuelled by set size effect findings for (direct) extralist
cuing tasks. Nelson et al. (1992) devised a Processing Implicit and Explicit
Representations (PIER) model which describes an independent and exclusive
parallel relationship between implicit and explicit processes in cued recall.
An interesting feature of the PIER model is that it predicts that the
magnitude of unconscious influences on direct tests should systematically vary
with instructions that emphasise use of one or both parallel pathways. In one
experiment (Experiment 4), Nelson et al. (1992) showed that when subjects had
to explicitly remember words and guess those they could not remember (both
explicit and implicit pathways) overall performance was higher than when
subjects were instructed to be very sure their responses were correct and not to
guess (explicit pathway only).
Nelson et al.'s (1992) model provides a neat way to conceptualise how
unconscious processes, such as those perhaps utilised when guessing,
contribute to overall performance on a direct test of memory. This model,
however, also assumes that conscious and unconscious processes are
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independent which, as previously shown, may or may not be founded. The
PIER model, in fact, goes one step further by stipulating an independent and
exclusive relationship between both processes with no overlap (Jacoby et al.,
1993). Moreover, in the guessing study referred to above, no check was made
on which responses were guessed and which were not guessed to be sure that
subjects were guessing more frequently in the guessing condition. In order to
lend these results more credibility, an additional analysis of guessed
completions would then be required in order to determine the proportion of
guessed responses that were also correct.
The validity of subjective measures
A final issue of some significance for the measurement of unconscious
influences on direct test performance concerns the validity of accepting a
subjective report as a reliable index of conscious experience. Although there is
now a large body of evidence claiming to demonstrate the existence of
unconscious processes, some authors, notably Eriksen (1960) and more recently
Holender (1986), have viewed the entire paradigm with suspicion. These
authors would consider self report that a stimulus was not consciously
remembered as not a sufficiently objective measure with which to validate
nonawareness and hence the influence of unconscious processes because there
always remains the possibility that aspects of the stimulus were allocated
conscious resources, even though subjects may not be able to verbalise this.
This reasoning has fuelled the assertion that objective measures constitute the
only reliable indicator of unconscious perception (Holender, 1986). This claim
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poses a substantial problem for research on unconscious processes because of
the difficulty in meeting the stringent requirements for defining objectivity. In
contradistinction to this point of view, however, Greenwald (1992), after
reviewing current research into unconscious processes, reported that objective
measures provide no compelling support for the existence of unconscious
processes. Moreover, Merikle (1992) stated that "subjective measures are the
only class of measures that have consistently led to successful demonstrations
of perception without awareness . . . [and that these]. . . measures can provide
an adequate indication of the presence or absence of relevant conscious
experiences" (p. 793-794). Thus, there is now quite a compelling argument that
unless subjective measures are accepted as providing valid evidence for
unconscious perception, productive research will cease (Merikle, 1992). Indeed,
credible research paradigms like the process dissociation framework not only
testify to the reality and measurability of unconscious processes, but also
establish that productive research using subjective measures has come a long
way. Subjective measures of conscious experience are also made use of in the
present study.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions from literature review
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Summary and conclusion
The literature reviewed above clearly establishes the importance of not
taking direct test performance at face value by accepting that it exclusively
reflects conscious influences. A reasonable hypothesis is that subjects utilise all
resources at their disposal, both conscious and unconscious, in meeting task
demands, and a few approaches have been devised which have attempted to
separate out the respective influence of these two processes. Foremost among
these are the process dissociation framework of Jacoby (1991) and the PIER
model of (Nelson et al., 1992). However neither approach directly investigates
the contribution that guessing makes to overall performance. An assumption is
sometimes made that guessing does contribute, yet no attempt has been made
to analyse the correctness or otherwise of responses designated by subjects as
guessed, or to determine how informed guessing may vary as a function of
LOP at study. Moreover, where unconscious and conscious processes have
been empirically separated (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Gardiner, 1988), no assessment of
subjects' confidence in their recoUective experience, which would permit the
use of stringent criteria for accepting responses as guesses, has been made. The
present experiments were designed to address these limitations and to enquire
directly about the role that guessing plays in overall performance.
Present experiments
The two experiments reported below aimed to shed further light on the
contribution that unconscious processes make to performance on a direct test of
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memory. There are dear similarities between the process dissociation
framework of Jacoby (1991) and Nelson et al.'s (1992) PIER model. The
approach taken in this study also shares similarities with these approaches, but
differs in the manner in which unconscious processes are measured. In the
present study, an estimate of unconscious influences was obtained directly by
determining the proportion of words correctly completed when conscious
recollection was reported as completely absent and subjects had to guess their
responses.
For the direct tests in the present study, subjects were asked to try to
remember words previously shown, but if they could not remember they were
required to make a guess. Subjects were also required to indicate their
confidence that each response was a word they remember from the study list.
Subjects made use of a dichotomous guess-know rating scale in Experiment 1
and a 5-point confidence rating scalein Experiment2 to indicate their degree of
conscious recollection for each response made. For both studies, words
reported by subjects as guessed were examined for correctness in order to
determine the extent to which subjects were able to make use of unconscious
informed guessing for words they could not explicitly remember.
32
Chapter 6: Experiment 1
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Introduction ^
The effect of guessing on direct test performance is an important issue that
warrants investigation with a number of different methodologies. One might
attempt to address the issue of informed guessing directlyby asking subjects to
refrain from responding if they are unsure of their direct test responses (e.g.,
Graf & Mandler, 1984; Hashtroudi et al., 1988; Roediger et al., 1992; Weldon,
Roediger, & Challis, 1989). Thisprocedure, however, apart from precluding an
analysis of the correctness or otherwiseof guesses, may also introduce response
bias into the data. For example, if subjects are instructed to respond to every
stem for an indirect test but are not permitted to guess direct test responses,
any dissociation between direct and indirect test performance may simply
reflect criterion differences in responding between the two tests rather than to
different underlying processes (Merikle «& Reingold, 1991).
In the two experiments which follow, direct test responses labelled by
subjects as not remembered and guessed were analysed in order to determine
the extent to which informed guessing contributes to overall performance, and
how this may vary as a function of LOP at study. The approach taken in this
study - a direct analysis of guessed direct test completions - has not previously
been undertaken. Therefore, Experiment 1 was a preliminary attempt to
establish the validity of the "analysis of guessing" methodology and the
existence of an informed guessing effect for normal subjects.
' A paper comprising Experiments 1 and 2 was accepted for publication in
Psychological Research and is currently in press. A copy of this paper is included in
Appendix F.
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On the basis of the reviewed literature, it was hypothesised, first, that
substantially more nonsemantically processed words and distractor words will
be rated as guessed than semantically processed words. This hypothesis
reflects the usual LOP effect obtained with direct tests, but its investigation will
also reveal the advantage (ifany) gained by minimalprocessing over and above
no processing in terms of explicit recollection. Second, because it appears that
direct test performance for (at least) nonsemantically processed words is
ordinarily improved by informed guessing, it was also expected that: (i)
performance for nonsemantically processed words will decline after removal of
all guessed data, to a level of performance similar to that found in comparable
studies where subjects were not permitted to guess (i.e., Graf &Mandler, 1984;
Hashtroudi et al., 1988), and (ii) that by directly analysing the proportions of
guessed responses that were also correct, a clear informed guessing effect will
be revealed for nonsemantically processed words. There was no current basis
for predicting an informed guessing effect for semantically processed words,
and this issue was explored.
Method
Subjects and design
Twelve subjects aged 17 to 31 (M = 20.089, SD = 4.730) were recruited.
Subjects were first year psychology students from the University of Tasmania
who received course credit for participation. The experimental design was
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completely within subjects with Word Type (semantic, nonsemantic, and
distractor) as the only factor.
Materials
Words were obtained from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart,
1981). This database comprises an extensive collection of words and associated
normative data on, for example, ratings of frequency of occurrence, familiarity,
concreteness, imageability, and meaningfulness for each word. The criteria for
selecting words was adopted from Graf and Mandler (1984) such that (i) each
word had six letters, (ii) the first three letters of each word uniquely defined
that word in the list, (iii) words had a low Kucera-Francis (Kucera & Francis,
1967) frequency of occurrence, and (iv) the three letter stem of each word was
shared by at least 10 other dictionary words.
From a pool of 98 words, 72 words were selected with Kucera-Francis
frequencies of 14 occurrences per million or less. Sixty words were randomly
allocated to one of three lists (List A, List B, or List C) each comprising 20
words, and the remaining 12 words were used as fillers. (Target words are
shown in Appendix A.) No significant differences were found between word
lists for any of the normative data. An additional list of 10 high Kucera-Francis
frequency words were used as practice items. The combination and
permutation order of the lists were consistently varied so that each list equally
often served as the semantic study list, the nonsemantic study list, and the
distractor list, and each list was equally often preceded and followed by
different lists.
36
Words and word stems were presented by an IBM compatible computer
on to the computer's monitor. All responses were made on lined study and test
forms provided, one response per line.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a sound attenuated room. Subjects
were comfortably seated approximately 600 mm from the monitor screen so
that stimuli subtended approximately 1.8 degrees of visual angle.
For the study phase, subjects were presented with two consecutive lists of
31 words. Each subject performed a semantic study task on one of the lists and
a nonsemantic study task on the other. The order of tasks was counterbalanced
across subjects. The first 5 words in each list served as practice items and the
next 3 and last 3 words on each list served as filler items to counter primacy
and recency effects. Thus, only 20 words on each list served as target words
and only the stems of these words and 20 new distractor words were used in
the test phase. The temporal sequence of events for the study phase was (i) 500
Hz tone (50 ms), (ii) pause (500 ms), (iii) presentation of study word (3000 ms,
Hashtroudi et al., 1988), and (iv) pause (500 ms). Subjects made their response
during the 3000 ms word presentation period.
Instructions for the two processing tasks were adapted from Graf and
Mandler (1984). The semantic processing task required subjects to rate along a
5-point scale how much they liked the meaning of the word presented. On this
scale, "1" equalled "don't like at all" and "5" equalled "like a lot." The
nonsemantic processing task required subjects to count the number of enclosed
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spaces in the letters of the word presented. (Verbatim instructions are shown in
Appendix B.) Subjects' responses were examined before they commenced the
study task proper to ensure that they were correctly following instructions.
Immediately following the study phase, subject's retention performance
was assessed by either a cued recall direct test or stem completion indirect test,
depending upon the subject's experimental condition. For each test, the first
three letters of the 40 target words and 20 new distractor words were presented
randomly interspersed. For the direct test, subjects were required to use these
letters as cues to help them recall words from the lists. If subjects had to guess
they were required to indicate that they had guessed by placing an asterisk
next to their response. For the indirect test, subjects were required to write
down the first word they could think of, excluding proper nouns, which began
with the letters. (Verbatim instructions are shown in Appendix B.) The
temporal sequence of events for the test phase was (i) button press, (ii) pause
(500 ms), and (ill) presentation of word stem. The test phase was self paced;
subjects completed their response then pressed a button to initiate the next trial.
Results and Discussion
The level of significance adopted for all statistical analyses was a < .05.
Where variables revealing significant main effects also entered into a significant
interaction, only the interaction effect was further analysed. All planned
comparisons between means were evaluated with two-tailed t-tests, and all f-
tests were matched or paired unless otherwise indicated. (The raw data set for
Experiment 1 is shown in Appendix C.)
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Table 1.
Mean Proportion of Correct Completions of Each Word Type for the Direct Test
of Experiment 1 Before and After Removal of Guessed Data.
Word Type
Semantic Nonsemantic Distractor
Retention Test Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Direct
Correct
Adjusted
.429
.338
.101
.105
.204
.113
.101
.117
Direct - Guesses *
Correct .396 .089 .067 .078
Adjusted .392 .089 .063 .078
.092 .079
.004 .014
Direct - Guesses = Direct test performance after the removal of all guessed
responses.
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The proportion of correct completions as a function of Word Type
(semantic, nonsemantic, and distractor) are presented in Table 1. To compare
the direct test results of this study with those from other studies where subjects
were not permitted to guess their direct test responses (e.g., Graf and Mandler,
1984; Hashtroudi et al., 1988; Roediger et al., 1992), a second condition was
created by excluding all guessed data. Data for this new condition is also
shown in Table 1.
The proportion of (nonstudied) distractor stems "correctly" completed
provides a baseline measure of the proportion of stems correctly completed by
chance alone. To adjust for chance, this figure was subtracted from the
proportion of correct completions for both semantically and nonsemantically
processed words.
As hypothesised. Table 1 shows that after removing guessed data, correct
completion drops markedly for nonsemantically processed words but has little
effect on semantically processed words. These values closely resemble those
from published studies where guessing was not permitted on the direct test
(Graf and Mandler, 1984; Hashtroudi et al., 1988). Prior to adjustment for
chance, the change for nonsemantically processed words (.204 - .067 = .137)
was highly significant [t(ll) = 7.021, p < .0001], but after chance adjustment, this
change (.113 - .063 = .05) did not quite reach significance [f(ll) = 2.002, p =
.071]. Thus, guessing clearly contributes to direct test performance, but
differentially as a function of LOP. A closer inspection of this differential effect
follows.
Table 2 displays the proportion of responses for each word type that were
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Table 2.
Mean Proportion of Completions of Each Word Type on the Direct Test in
Experiment 1 That Were Reported as Guessed, and the Proportion of These
Completions That Were Also Correct.
Word Type
Semantic Nonsemantic Distractor
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Guessed .508 .140 .804 .141 .808 .148
Correctly Guessed * .065 .076 .178 .099 .104 .085
Proportion of guessed completions that were also correct divided hy the
proportion of total guessed completions.
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guessed as well as the proportion of these responses that were also correct (i.e.,
correct guesses divided by total guesses). A one-way repeated measures
ANOVA on the total proportion of guessed completions revealed a significant
effect of Word Type [(F(2,22) = 86.929, p < .0001]. Significantly fewer
semantically processed words were guessed than nonsemantically processed
words [t(ll) = 11.504, p <.0001] and distractor words [f(ll) = 9.052, p < .0001].
The latter two did not significantly differ from each other [t(ll) = .248, ns]. As
hypothesised, this result shows that no advantage was gained for nonsemantic
processing over and above no processingin terms of explicitrecollection.
For guessed responses that were also correct, a second ANOVA also
revealed a significant effect of Word Type [F(2,22) = 6.343, p = .007]. Although
the level of completion of semantically processed words and distractor words
did not significantly differ [f(ll) = 1.310, ns], significantlymore nonsemantically
processed words were completed than either semantically processed words
[f(ll) = 3.347,p = . 007] or distractor words [f(ll) = 2.238, p = .047]. Thus, when
completions were guessed, completions of nonsemantically processed words
were more likely to be correct than were completions of semantically processed
words or distractor words. As hypothesised, this result establishes that direct
test completion of nonsemantically processed words is influenced by
unconscious processes. For these words, 17.8% of guessed completions were
correct, a figure significantly larger than what would be expected by chance
alone (10.4%). In real terms, this amounts to an increase in direct test
performance of about 13.7%prior to adjusting for chance correct completions or
5.0% after subtracting for chance. Thus, it appears that subjects can be
unwittingly resourceful in completing a task for which no conscious
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information is available provided that information is minimally processed at
study and guessing is permitted at test. Experiment 2 was undertaken to
quantify this effect in a more rigorous marmer.
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Chapter 7: Experiment 2
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Introduction
In Experiment 1, study tasks were presented within subjects as two
counterbalanced blocks of trials. This is how study tasks are often presented in
impUcit memory research. Recent work by Challis and Brodbeck (1992),
however, has shown that blocked study designs can lead to task-specific or
context (e.g., cognitive "set") effects which contribute to LOP dissociation
effects. These authors showed that when semantic and nonsemantic tasks were
presented blocked within subjects or as a between subjects factor, indirect test
performance was better following semantic processing but when tasks were
presented mixed within subjects, no LOP effect was found. Challis and
Brodbeck (1992), drawing upon the work of Weldon (1991) who reported that
lexical processing is essential for priming, suggested that blocked or between
subject presentations may discourage complete lexical processing in the
nonsemantic condition because subjects may learn to pay little attention to the
words as a whole, but only to structural aspects of them. Mixed within subjects
designs, on the other hand, because of the unpredictability of the tasks, may
encourage more thorough lexical processing prior to additional semantic or
nonsemantic processing. In Experiment 2, study tasks were randomly
presented within subjects in an effort to determine whethercognitive set effects
contributed to the LOP-based informed guessing effects found in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 also trialed a new 5-point confidence rating scale as a
method of obtaining subjective information about which direct test responses
were guessed. This rating method was favoured because it permits use of a.
more stringent criterion for guessing and it may also reduce the likelihood of
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response biascontributing to dissociation effects (see discussion in introduction
to Experiment 1). Reductions in response bias are expected because a rating
scale of this type permits subjects the option of indicating the degree to which
they are unsure about their responses rather than simply omitting them (as in
someprevious studies) or dichotomously grouping them (asin Experiment 1).
On the basis of the reviewed literature and the findings from Experiment
1, it was hypothesised, first, that there will be significant priming on the
indirect test for both semantically and nonsemantically processed words, and a
dissociation between direct test and indirect test performance as a function of
LOP. It is important to show these normally obtained results to establish the
validityof the data for further analysis of informed guessingeffects. Second, it
was hypothesised that with a more rigorous experimental design including
randomised study tasks and the use of a confidence rating scale, the LOP-based
informed guessing effect from Experiment 1 will be replicated. Confirmation of
this hypothesis would establish that the informed guessing effect is both
reliable and robust. Finally, because thinking of the first word that comes to
mind and making a guess are expected to involve similar cognitiveprocesses, it
was hypothesised that the level of performance for nonsemantically processed
words across retention tests is comparable.
Method
Subjects and design
Thirty six subjects aged 17 to 28 (M = 19.394, SD = 2.065) were recruited.
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Subjects were first year psychology students from the University of Tasmania
who received course credit for participation. The experimental design
conformed to a 3 X 2 mixed format with Word Type (semantic, nonsemantic,
and distractor) as a within subjects factor and Retention Test (direct or indirect)
as a between subjects factor.
Materials
The materials were the same as for Experiment 1 except for the following
modifications: (i) Because the direct and indirect nature of the tests given to
subjects rests critically on the instructions supplied (Graf & Mandler, 1984;
Merikle & Reingold, 1991; Schacter et al., 1989), all instructions were
standardised across subjects by audio cassette administration, and (ii) a 5-point
confidence rating scale was used, instead of a dichotomous scale as in
Experiment 1, to assess conscious recollective experience.
Procedure
The procedure was also similar to Experiment 1 with the following
alterations. A new random allocation of words to lists A, B, and C was
undertaken. During the study phase, subjects were presented with 62 words.
The first 10 words served as practice items and the next 6 and last 6 words
served as filler items. The remaining 40 words comprised two lists of 20 target
words each. Only the stems of these target words and 20 new distractor words
were used in the test phase. Each subject performed a semantic processing task
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on one of the lists and a nonsemantic processing task on the other. The order of
presentation of the two tasks was counterbalanced acrosssubjects.
Prior to each trial an instructional cue appeared centrally on the screen to
indicate which processing task the subject was to perform on the forthcoming
study word. For the semantic processing task, the boxed cue "rate likabUity"
appeared on the screenand for the nonsemantic processing task, the boxed cue
"count enclosed spaces" appeared. The most appropriate exposure duration
for the task cues was selected on the basis of a pilot work. Unlike the blocked
and counterbalanced method of presentation of study tasks in Experiment 1,
the study tasks in the present experiment were presented randomly. The
temporal sequence of events for the study phase was: (i) 500 Hz tone (50 ms),
(ii) task cue (4000 ms), (iii) pause (500 ms), (iv) presentation of study word
(3000 ms), and (v) pause (500 ms). Subjects made their responses during the
3000 ms presentation time and were alerted to the start of the next trial by the
500 Hz tone.
For the test phase the temporal sequence of events and the presentation of
word stems was the same as for Experiment 1. Subjects in the indirect test
condition were told to write down the very first word they could think of,
excluding proper nouns, which completed the stem. Instructions for the direct
test were the same as for Experiment 1 except subjects were instructed to
respond to every trial even if they could not remember a word from the list that
goes with the stem and, after making their response, to rate along a scale from 0
to 4 to indicate how confident they were that their response was a word that
they remember. On this scale, 0 equalled "Don't remember at all; a complete
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guess" and 4 equalled "Clearly remember." (Verbatim instructions are shown
in Appendix D.)
Results and Discussion
Priming and dissociation effects
For each word type, the proportion of correct completions and chance
adjusted correct completions for direct and indirect tests are shown in Table 3.
(Theraw data set for Experiment2 is shown in Appendix E.)
For the indirect test, significantly more semantically processed words
[t{17) = 8.573, p < .0001] and nonsemantically processed words [f(ll) = 6.413, p
< .0001] were correctly completed than were distractor words, the completion
rate of which represents chance level performance. Thus, as hypothesised,
significant priming occurred for both semantically processed words and
nonsemantically processed words.
The chance adjusted data was analysed by a 2 (LOP) X 2 (Retention Test)
mixed design ANOVA which revealed a significant main effect of LOP [f(l,34)
= 24.161, p < .0001] and Retention Test [F(l,34) = 7.116, p = .012], and a
significant LOP X Retention Test interaction [F(l,34) = 14.290, p = .0006].
Further analysis of this interaction revealed (i) no significant effect of LOP on
the indirect test [f(17) = .877, ns], (ii) significantly more completions of
semantically processed words than nonsemantically processed words on the
direct test [f(17) = 5.702, p <.0001], (iii) significantly more direct test completions
than indirect test completions for semantically processed words [f(34) = 4.669,p
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Table 3.
Mean Proportion of Correct Completions of Each Word Type For Direct and
Indirect Tests of Memory in Experiment 2.
Word Type
Semantic Nonsemantic Distractor
Retention Test Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Indirect
Correct .293 .088 .264 .125 .069 .060
Adjusted .223 .110 .194 .129 - —
Direct
Correct .473 .126 .253 .106 .081 .055
Adjusted .393 .128 .172 .098 — —
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< .0001, unmatched t-test], and (iv) no significant effect of Retention Test for
nonsemantically processed words [t(34) = .582, ns, unmatched f-test].
This analysis confirms the expected dissociation between direct test and
indirect test performance as a function of LOP. That is, performance on the
indirect test was relatively insensitive to LOP at study whereas direct test
performance is highly sensitive to LOP. As hypothesised, this analysis also
shows that retaining guessed data leads to a level of performance for
nonsemantically processed words that is comparable irrespective of whether a
direct test or an indirect test is given. Finally, although the magnitude of direct
test performance is somewhat lower in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2
(compare Tables 1 and 3), the LOP effect for the direct test in each experiment
was almost exactly the same (.225 and .221 respectively). That is, as
hypothesised, the change in the design of the study phase, from within subjects
blocked in Experiment 1 to within subjects random in Experiment 2, did not to
alter the pattern of results obtained.
Analysis of confidence ratings
The confidence rating scale permits the categorisation of responses as
"guessed" or "remembered" according to different criteria. Because the interest
here was in informed guessing hypothesised to take place when no conscious
information is available to assist retrieval, a stringent criterion was chosen to
define a guess. This criterion accepts that only responses rated 0 (i.e., "Don't
remember at all; a complete guess") be considered guessed, on the basis that a
o>. .40
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• Distroctor
Confidence Rating
Figure 1. Frequency of use of each confidence rating for direct test completion
of semantically processed, nonsemantically processed, and distractor words in
Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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rating of 1 or more indicates uncertainty or the possible presence of conscious
information that may be used to guide retrieval. Conversely, only responses
rated 4 (i.e., "Clearly remember") were accepted as remembered on the basis that
a rating of anything less than 4 indicates uncertainty or familiarity rather than
explicit recollection. The pattern of usage of confidence ratings for all
completions as a function of Word Type are shown in Figure 1.
Inspection of Figure 1 illustrates that ratings of 0 (i.e., guessed) and
ratings of 4 (i.e., remembered) accounted for a large proportion of all ratings
made whereas the intermediate or "uncertain" ratings of 1, 2, and 3 were used
much less often. The percentage of responses rated either 0 or 4 was 71.5%,
67.8%, and 70.6% (M = 70.0%) for semantically processed, nonsemantically
processed, and distractor words, respectively. This clearly represents a
nonsignificant effect of Word Type [F(2,34) = .789, ns] and establishes that
subjects were equally confident about their use of extreme ratings (0 and 4) for
each word type. That is, there was no bias among subjects toward adopting
different response criteria for designating completions for any word type as
extreme. This conclusion attests to the validity of comparing each word type
for the frequency of use of extreme ratings and the significance ascribed to
them in this experiment.
Analysis of guessed data
Table 4 displays the proportion of responses for each word type that were
designated as guessed (i.e., correct completions that received a confidence
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Table 4.
Mean Proportion of Completions of Each Word Type on the Direct Test in
Experiment 2 That Were Reported as Guessed, and the Proportion of These
Completions That Were Also Correct.
Word Type
Semantic Nonsemantic Distractor
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Guessed .339 .176 .611 .229 .698 .230
Correctly Guessed* .016 .036 .133 .126 .061 .067
Proportion of guessed completions that were also correct divided by the
proportion of total guessed completions.
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rating of 0) and the proportion of these responses that were also correct (i.e.,
correct guesses divided by total guesses).
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on the guessed data showed a
significanteffectof Word Type [f(2,34) = 51.129, p < .0001]. Significantly fewer
semantically processed words were guessed than were nonsemantically
processed words [f(17) = 6.092, p <.0001] and distractorwords [f(17) = 10.334, p
< .0001], and significantly fewer nonsemantically processed words were
guessed than distractor words [f(17) = 2.879, p = .010]. As hypothesised, this
result shows that substantially less information was available to guide retrieval
of nonsemantically processed words than for semantically processed words.
Comparison of Tables 2 and 4 shows that overall levels of guessing were lower
in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. This difference, and the finding that
some advantage was gained for nonsemantic processing over no processing in
terms of explicit recollection of study words in Experiment 2 but not in
Experiment 1, probably reflects the differing criteria used to define a guess
between the two experiments. The stringent criterion of Experiment2 excluded
ratings of 1 which might conceivably have been grouped as guesses by subjects
in Experiment 1, thus leading to an increase in total guessing rates, especially
for distractor words which were typically rated 0 or 1 (see Figure 1).
For correctly guessed completions, a final ANOVA revealed a significant
effect of Word Type [f(2,34) = 10.746, p = .0002]. There were significantly more
correctly guessed responses of nonsemantically processed words than
distractor words [f(17) = 2.590, p = .019] and significantly more correctly
guessed responses of distractor words than semantically processed words [f(17)
55
= 3.192, p = .005]. Moreover, the proportion of correctly guessed semantically
processed words was not significantly greater than zero [f(17) = 1.836, «s]. As
hypothesised, these results replicate the correct guessing results from
Experiment 1 in showing that when completions were guessed, completions of
nonsemantically processed words were more likely to be correct than
completions of semantically processed words or distractor words. This result
adds additional weight to the conclusion that overall direct test performance is
reliably influenced by unconsciousprocesses. With a larger subject sample and
a more stringent criterion for guessing, however, these results also reveal that
correct guessing of semantically processed words is substantially worse than
chance and no better than zero. Thus, informed guessing does not influence
cued recall of semantically processed words at all. The fact that these results,
based on random presentation of study tasks, replicate Experiment 1 results,
based on counterbalanced blocked presentation, confirms the hypothesis that it
is trial-by-trial information that is critical in attaining these informed guessing
results rather than any context or cognitive set effects.
A final point to note is that although the confidence rating scale used in
Experiment 2 is arguably a more sensitive method for categorising guessed
responses than the dichotomous scale of Experiment 1 (i.e., there is less
likelihood of contaminating 0 ratings with uncertainty), the results of
Experiment 1 are quite consistent with the results of Experiment 2.
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Discussion
Although blocked study task designs for indirect tests appear to
encourage context or set effects resulting in an increased LOP effect (Challis &
Brodbeck, 1992), the present study found that the study task design of the
direct test does not appear to affect the size of the LOP effect. The finding that
the direct test LOP effect was the same between Experiment 1 and 2 despite
different study task designs discourages the view that dissociation and
informed guessing effects are due to context or cognitive set effects inherent in
processing tasks in general rather than to encoding of item-specific information
on each study trial. This finding provides greater confidence that the informed
guessing effects discussed further below are both reliable and robust.
Of particular importance to the aims and hypotheses of this study was a
close analysis of those direct test responses that subjects guessed. Results from
both Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a substantially larger proportion of
nonsemantically processed words and distractor words were guessed than
were semantically processed words. Consistent with the ubiquitous finding
that LOP at study affects direct test performance (Craik and Lockhart, 1972;
Craik & Tulving, 1975), this result confirms that considerably more information
related to the explicit (conscious) retrievability of words is available following
semantic processing than following nonsemantic processing.
Because direct tests were traditionally thought to measure intentional or
conscious influences on performance, measurable unconscious influences on
direct test performance is, however, a far more interesting finding. A minimal
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assumption in interpreting evidence for unconscious influences in the present
study was that above chance correct guessing on the direct test reflects
unconscious influences. The viability of this assumption rests, first, on the
validity of accepting a subjective report as reflecting an absence of conscious
experience, and second, on the logic of defining a guess as when such an
absence of conscious experience occurred at the time of test. With regard to the
former issue, literature reviewed earlier clearly established the validity of
subjective measures (Greenwald, 1992; Merikle, 1992). Moreover, in terms of
the present study, subjective measures were clearly the relevant ones to use
because they revealed what was and what was not available to consciousness.
In Experiment 1, however, where subjects used a forced-choice dichotomous
rating scale to designate guessed responses, there is some question as to
whether a guess always conformed to the strict definition of no conscious
awareness. With the 5-point confidence rating scale used in Experiment 2, on
the other hand, we can be considerably more certain that responses classified as
"guessed" reflect a complete absence ofconscious experience. With this more
stringent criterion, results showed that correct guessing of nonsemantically
processed words remained significantly greater than chance level performance,
thereby establishing the unequivocal presence of unconsciousinfluences.
The analysis of guessing methodology used in the present study shares
similarities with other approaches aimed at separating conscious from
i
unconscious influences within a specific task, but,also offers something unique.
Both Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation framework and Nelson et al.'s (1992)
PIER model make assumptions about the relationship between implicit and
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explicit processes. The process dissociation approach assumes that implicit and
explicit processes are independent of each other, but that there may be some
degree of overlap (Jacoby et al., 1993). The PIER model also assumes
independence, but proposes a more mutually exclusive relationship between
implicit and explicit processes with no overlap (Jacoby et al., 1993). Although
this difference between the two models is likely to have little effect on
predictions made (Jacoby, 1991), a recent reinterpretation of Jacoby's (1991)
framework by Joordens and Merikle (1993), which assumes complete
dependence and overlap between implicit and explicit processes, is likely to
lead to quite different predictions. The analysis of guessing approach used in
this study, in contrast, makes no assumption about the relationship between
implicit and explicit processes. It does share a similarity with Jacoby's (1991)
exclusion task methodology, however, in that it attempts to eliminate any
contribution of explicit processes prior to measuring an implicit or unconscious
effect. Explicit processes are eliminated in the exclusion task by asking subjects
to exclude responses they remember from the study list and explicit processes
were excluded in the present study by using only responses with meniory
confidence ratings of zero.
The analysis of guessing approach shares additional similarities with the
process dissociation framework and Gardiner's (1988) "know-remember"
approach inasmuch as data derived from each approach comprises subjective
estimates of recollective experience. Almost all memory studies measure
subjective data, but subjective data is a particularly salient feature of the design
of the present study and the study of Gardiner (1988). In both studies, subjects
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were asked to make decisions about the strength or salience of subjective events
based on criteria set by task instructions. Gardiner (1988) required subjects to
discern whether their conscious recollections could be categorised as episodic or
nonepisodic. In the present study, subjects were required to discern whether
their recollective experience was strong, weak, or absent. Presumably a similar
subjective assessment is also required for deciding whether a target item
qualifies as remembered or not remembered in Jacoby's (1991) exclusion task.
An advantage of the present approach over the process dissociation
approach and Gardiner's (1988) approach, however, stems from the use of a
confidence rating scale to assess recollection rather than requiring subjects to
dichotomously choose between explicit recollection and absence of explicit
recollection. It is likely that a dichotomous scale is considerably more open to
the effects of response bias, where subject responses come to reflect differing
criteria for accepting any word as remembered, than is a confidence rating
scale. This is because a rating scale permits subjects the option of indicating
their degree of recollective experience rather than forcing them to choose
between explicit recollection and absence of explicit recollection.
The other important advantage of a confidence rating scale is that it
permits use of a stringent criterion of absence of recollection. The highly
conservative criterion adopted for defining a guess in Experiment 2 (i.e., the
confidence ratings of zero only) firmly increases the certainty with which
complete absence of awareness can be claimed. This is quite an important
advantage over dichotomous scales given the general suspicion surrounding
the use of subjective measures (e.g., Holender, 1986). Thus, in terms of
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ensuring no contamination by explicit processes, it is reasonable to consider the
analysis of guessing methodology with a confidence rating scale to be at least
as reliable as the process dissociation framework.
The present study also revealed that the measurable influence of
unconscious processes on direct test performance varies as a function of LOP at
study. The finding from Experiment 2 that there was no significant difference
across retention tests for the completion of nonsemantically processed words
when guesses were included as data is consistent with the view that a direct
test on nonsemantically processed irrformation when guessing is permitted is
analogous to an indirect test of this information (cf. Merikle & Reingold, 1991).
That is, if subjects do not explicitly remember a word but are required to
supply a response anyway, subjects' guesses may engage the same cognitive
processes engaged during an indirect test where subjects simply write the first
word that comes to mind (cf. Jacoby & HoUingshead, 1990). This reasoning is
consistent with the finding from the subliminal perception literature that
guessing is like an indirect test for information rendered subliminal (Dixon,
1971), and is consistent with the results of Gabrieli et al. (1990) and Graf et al.
(1984) for amnesic subjects. The informed guessing that amnesic subjects
readily demonstrate for both semantically processed and nonsemantically
processed words, may parallel the informed guessing that normal subjects
show, except normal subjects do not seem to benefit from guessing
semantically processed words. The most parsimonious explanation for these
seemingly disparate results is that it is only when little or no information is
available to guide retrieval that informed guessing comes into play. For
62
amnesic subjects this may be the rule, but for normal subjects this might only
occur when information has been minimally processed. When some
information is available to guide retrieval (i.e., after semantic processing),
unconscious influences for normal subjects may be inhibited. Together, these
findings stress the importance of a close analysis of direct test responses which
subjects claim they do not remember. If subjects do not remember but are
required to make a response anyway, unconscious influences unwittingly come
into play.
The fact that subjects can unwittingly use unconscious resources to
correctly complete some words they cannot explicitly remember implies that
there exists some complementary relationship between conscious and-
unconscious processes. That is, if information is not forthcoming with the
application of conscious effort, this same information may be forthcoming if
such effort is allayed. This conclusion, however, does not imply that conscious
and unconscious influences are additive, independent, or exclusive in their
contribution to overall performance level (cf. Jacoby, 1991; Nelson et al., 1992).
In contrast, the present results warrant only the more conservative conclusion
that conscious and unconscious influences are somewhat (at least empirically)
separable resources, their admixture of which defines a more complete
experience than either resource alone.
»;
It is important to note, however, that the informed guessing effects that
were measured in this study might not be the only unconscious influence on
direct test performance. The scope of the present study was limited to
measuring a small subset of correct direct test responses which, with some
63
certainty, could be ascribed as having been influenced by unconscious
processes. It would be inappropriate, however, to classify the remaining
correct responses as being exclusively due to explicit influences. First,
independent of assumptions about the relationship between implicit or explicit
processes, the stringent criterion for guesses in Experiment 2 may have led to
an underestimate of unconscious influences. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, estimating the true magnitude of unconscious influences depends
on how the relationship between conscious and unconscious processes is
conceptualised.
The assumption of independence, upon which the process dissociation
approach and the PIER model are based, will always lead toa lower estimate of
unconscious influences then the equally tenable alternate assumption that
conscious and unconscious influences are strongly correlated (Joordens &
Merikle, 1993). This alternative conceptualisation assumes that conscious
influences are always associated with corresponding unconscious antecedents
Goordens & Merikle, 1993) and, hence, that conscious influences define only a
small subset of a much larger set of unconscious influences that happen to be
momentarily conscious in order to meet task demands (cf. Ornstein, 1991).
From an evolutionary viewpoint, Joordens and Merikle's (1993) model is highly
persuasive. It argues for the primacy of unconscious influences at the highest
levels of human cognition (Lhermitte&Serdaru, 1993; Reber, 1990; 1993).
Conclusion
The analysis of guessed responses in this study revealed that direct test
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performance improves by guessing completions of nonsemantically processed
words but does not improve by guessing completions of semantically
processed words. This result points to a fundamental distinction in the
experience of a direct test as a function of whether a word has been deeply
processed or minimally processed at study. These results also contribute to the
gradually developing viewpoint that memory tests are rarely process pure
measures (cf. Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al., 1992; Jacoby et al., 1993; Joordens &
Merikle, 1993; Merikle & Reingold, 1991; Nelson, et al., 1992; Richardson-
Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). That is, subjects can effectively utilise unconscious
resources in performing a test which traditionally has been thought to measure
explicit influences only. These findings challenge psychologists to develop
improved methods ofmeasuring cognitive processes and to be cautious in their
interpretation of data from already existing methods.
It is traditionally held that conscious resources are the essential
requirement for generating effective, useful, and adaptive behaviour (e.g.,
Ornstein, 1991). The finding in this study that guessing aids performance by
accessing unconscious resources, however, establishes that subjects can be
unwittingly or unconsciously resourceful in their capacity to "remember"
information they cannot consciously retrieve. The present study and other
studies that reveal unconscious influences on behaviour establish the
importance of a holistic conceptualisation of human potentiality. This
conceptualisation should encompass both resources of which we are aware and
resources of which we have no conscious awareness.
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Appendix A: Target words used in Experiments 1
and 2
78
Table Al.
List Allocation and Normative Data for Target Words Used in Experiments 1
and 2.
Target List Expt 1 List Expt 2 No. Stems K-F freq Fam Cone Image
BALLOT A C 11.00 12.00 453.00 455.00 437.00
BASKET A A 11.00 17.00 485.00 606.00 560.00
BURROW A C 16.00 4.00 421.00 426.00 444.00
CARROT A B 34.00 1.00 539.00 622.00 577.00
CHAPEL A B 48.00 20.00 471.00 587.00 560.00
CLOVER A C 16.00 16.00 486.00 554.00 606.00
FRENZY A A 13.00 6.00 409.00 303.00 450.00
GENDER A B 10.00 2.00 450.00 408.00 376.00
INSULT A C 14.00 7.00 552.00 375.00 477.00
OUTSET A A 23.00 13.00 394.00 305.00 270.00
POSTER A C 13.00 4.00 545.00 592.00 600.00
PREFIX A C 32.00 0.00 407.00 370.00 353.00
REFUSE » A C 15.00 16.00 518.00 426.00 419.00
RESORT A B 16.00 12.00 523.00 499.00 523.00
SALUTE A B 15.00 3.00 479.00 471.00 538.00
SCROLL A B 18.00 0.00 350.00 593.00 572.00
SHOVEL A B 18.00 5.00 528.00 581.00 538.00
SHRIMP A B 10.00 2.00 546.00 629.00 618.00
TRANCE A B 40.00 4.00 436.00 368.00 463.00
TRIPOD A C 29.00 3.00 363.00 577.00 574.00
BLOUSE B A 14.00 1.00 562.00 640.00 595.00
BREEZE B A 18.00 14.00 511.00 500.00 560.00
CASKET B A 13.00 0.00 466.00 613.00 588.00
COLLAR B C 23.00 17.00 509.00 622.00 582.00
CRADLE B C 22.00 7.00 478.00 587.00 592.00
FLOWER B B 15.00 23.00 566.00 584.00 618.00
GRAVEL B B 32.00 9.00 502.00 587.00 569.00
GROCER B A 14.00 1.00 519.00 576.00 551.00
HERMIT B A 11.00 0.00 407.00 508.00 537.00
INFANT B C 19.00 11.00 513.00 579.00 600.00
MANURE B C 26.00 6.00 458.00 644.00 534.00
MORTAL B B 12.00 10.00 454.00 406.00 402.00
PLANET B B 28.00 21.00 457.00 523.00 578.00
PLUNGE B A 15.00 5.00 441.00 396.00 548.00
QUIVER B B 18.00 0.00 368.00 485.00 505.00
REPAIR B A 21.00 20.00 543.00 394.00 440.00
SPONGE B A 10.00 7.00 538.00 597.00 577.00
SPRINT B A 12.00 0.00 461.00 411.00 526.00
STARCH B A 48.00 4.00 459.00 555.00 497.00
TENNIS B B 15.00 15.00 528.00 574.00 634.00
BANDIT C C 15.00 3.00 388.00 547.00 562.00
BARREL C A 26.00 24.00 487.00 590.00 602.00
BEAVER C A 15.00 3.00 470.00 589.00 612.00
BRANDY C B 22.00 7.00 542.00 595.00 590.00
CANARY C A 22.00 0.00 411.00 577.00 533.00
CHERRY C B 17.00 6.00 514.00 611.00 582.00
CHISEL C A 20.00 4.00 469.00 597.00 567.00
GALAXY C A 12.00 3.00 423.00 465.00 575.00
GARLIC C C 11.00 4.00 509.00 636.00 565.00
IMPORT C c • 14.00 17.00 511.00 320.00 361.00
MAROON C C 22.00 3.00 492.00 486.00 503.00
MISUSE C B 20.00 5.00 457.00 318.00 367.00
PARCEL C A 43.00 1.00 503.00 525.00 509.00
PRIEST C C 28.00 16.00 484.00 561.00 568.00
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Table A1 (continued).
List Allocation and Normative Data for Target Words Used in Experiments 1
and 2.
Target List Expt 1 List Expt 2 No. Stems K-F freq Fam Cone Image
SERIAL C B 14.00 7.00 440.00 365.00 340.00
SQUINT C C 20.00 1.00 528.00 456.00 515.00
STRIPE C C 34.00 4.00 457.00 550.00 562.00
THRILL C A 16.00 5.00 504.00 320.00 483.00
TREMOR C B 20.00 2.00 401.00 487.00 491.00
TURTLE C C 11.00 8.00 509.00 644.00 564.00
Mean 19.83 7.35 476.57 512.78 523.98
SD
" ~
9.19 6.66 52.93 101.06 80.70
Note: No. Stems = number of words in MRC Database which had the same
three letter stem, K-F freq = Kucera-Francis frequency of occurrence, Fam =
familiarity. Cone = concreteness, and image = imageability.
* In Experiment 2, the word REFUSE was replaced with the word POLLEN
because subjects were strongly biased toward responding with the word
REFECTORY (which is the name of the university canteen usually denoted "the
ref").
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Table Bl.
Study Phase Instructions for Experiment 1.
Semantic processing condition
In this part of the experiment, words will appear on the screen in front of
you, one every 3 seconds. You are to rate how much you like the meaning of
each word along a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 equals "don't like at aU" and 5
equals "like a lot." By meaning it is meant what the word stands for or denotes,
not what it sounds like. Is that clear? Write your answers on the sheet in front
of you, one line per trial. To help you get used to the task, the first 5 trials are
for practice. Are you ready?
Nonsemantic instructions
In this part of the experiment, words will appear on the screen in front of
you, one every 3 seconds. You are to count the number of enclosed spaces in
the letters of the word. For example, in the word TABLE {show example), there
are 3 enclosed spaces; one in the 'A' and 2 in the 'B.' Can you see them? Write
your answers on the sheet in front of you, one line per trial. To help you get
used to the task, the first 5 trials are for practice. Are you ready?
Table B2.
Test Phase Instructions for Experiment 1.
Indirect test condition
Before you begin the next part of the experiment, here is a small filler task
for you to do. You will be shown a number of word stems comprising the first
three letters of words. Your job is to write down the veryfirst word that comes
to mind that completes the stem. But please don't write any proper nouns. Is
that clear? Press the button to begin and as soon as you make your response
press it again for the next word, and so on. Its important to respond to every
trial and work speedily. Write your answers on the sheet in front of you, one
line per trial. Remember, write down the very first word that comes to mind.
Are you ready?
Direct test condition
In this part of the experiment, you will be shown a number of word stems
comprising the first three letters of the words you just saw. Your job is to use
the stems to help you remember as many of these words as you can. You
should respond to every trial even if you can't remember the word from the list
that goes with the stem. If you cannot remember and make a guess, indicate
that you have guessed by placing an asterisk next to your response. Is that
clear?
Press the button to begin and when you've made your response, press it
again for the next word, and so on. It's important to work speedily while
maintaining accuracy. Write your answers on the sheet in front of you, one line
per trial. Are you ready?
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Table Cl.
Proportion of Semantically Processed. Nonsemantically Processed, and
Distractor Words Correctly Completed for the Direct Test in Experiment 1.
Word Type
s Test Sem NSem Dist
1 Direct .300 .200 .050
2 Direct .400 .050 .000
3 Direct .450 .250 .050
4 Direct .400 .200 .200
5 Direct .550 .100 .250
6 Direct .300 .150 .050
7 Direct .500 .300 .100
8 Direct .350 .200 .150
9 Direct .600 .200 .050
10 Direct .550 .450 .150
11 Direct .350 .150 .050
12 Direct .400 .200 .000
Mean .429 .204 .092
SD .101 .101 .079
Note: Sem = semantic processing condition, NSem = nonsemantic processing
condition, Dist = distractors.
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Table C2.
Mean Proportion of Completions for EachWord Type on the Direct Test in
Experiment 1That Were Reported as Guessed, and the Proportion of These
Completions That Were Also Correct.
pG pC pCG
s Sem NSem Dist Sem NSem Dist Sem NSem Dist
1 .400 .700 .750 .050 .150 .050 .125 .214 .067
2 .550 .750 .750 .050 .000 .000 .091 .000 .000
3 .450 .750 .900 .000 .050 .050 .000 .067 .056
4 .600 .850 .850 .050 .150 .200 .083 .177 .235
5 .500 1.000 1.000 .050 .100 .250 .100 .100 .250
6 .700 .900 .900 .000 .100 .050 .000 .111 .056
7 .550 .750 .650 .100 .250 .100 .182 .333 .154
8 .650 .950 .950 .000 .200 .150 .000 .211 .158
9 .500 .800 .750 .100 .150 .050 .200 .188 .067
10 .250 .650 .650 .000 .200 .100 .000 .308 .154
11 .650 1.000 1.000 .000 .150 .050 .000 .150 .050
12 .300 .550 .550 .000 .150 .000 .000 .273 .000
Mean .508 .804 .808 .033 .138 .088 .065 .178 .104
SD .140 .141 .148 .039 .068 .077 .076 .099 .085
Note: pG = Proportion of guessed completions, pC = proportion of guessed
completions that were also correct, pCG = pC/pG.
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Table Dl.
Study Phase Instructions for Experiment 2.
In this part of the experiment, words will appear on the screen in front of
you, one every 3 seconds. For each trial, you willbe instructed to do one of two
things: Either rate how much you like the meaning of the word along a scale
from 0 to 4 where 0 equals "don't like at aU" and 4 equals "like a lot." By
meaning it is meant what the word stands for or denotes to you, not what it
sounds like; Or count the number of enclosed spaces in the letters of the word.
For example, in the word TABLE shown now on the screen, there are 3
enclosed spaces; one in the 'A' and 2 in the 'B.' Can you see them?
The two tasks will be delivered in a random order and before each task an
instruction on the screen will tell you which task to do for the next word that
appears. Write your answers on the answer sheet in front of you, one line per
trial. In case you forget, the scale for the rating task is shown on the card in
front of you. The first 10 trials are for practice. Areyou ready?
Table D2.
Test Phase Instructions for Experiment 2.
Indirect test condition
Before you begin the next part of the experiment, there is a small filler task
for you to do. You will be shown a number of word stems comprising the first
three letters of words. Your job is to write down the veryfirst word that comes
to mind that completes the stem. But please don't write any proper nouns. Is
that clear? Press the button to begin and as soon as you make your response
press it again for the next word, and so on. Its important to respond to every
trial and work speedily. Write your answers on the answer sheet in front of
you, one line per trial. Remember, write down the very first word that comes to
mind. Are you ready?
Direct test condition
In this part of the experiment, you will be shown a number of word stems
comprising the first three letters of the words you just saw. Your job is to use
the stems to help you remember as many of these words as you can. You
should respond to every trial even if you can't remember the word from the list
that goes with the stem.
When you've made your response, rate along a scale from 0 to 4 your
confidence that your response was a word that you remember from the list. On
this scale, 0 equals "Don't remember at all; a complete guess" and 4 equals
"Clearly remember." Is that clear? Press the button to begin and when you've
made your response, press it again for the next word, and so on. It's important
to work speedily while maintaining accuracy. Write your answers on the
answer sheet in front of you, one line per trial and your rating from 1 to 4 in the
space following your answer. In case you forget, the confidence rating scale is
shown on the card in front of you. Are you ready?
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Table El.
Proportion of Semantically Processed. Nonsemantically Processed, and
Distractor Word.s Correctly Completed for the Direct and Indirect Test in
Experiment 2.
Word Type
s Test Sem NSem Dist
1 Direct .7000 .1500 .1000
2 Direct .2500 .1000 .0000
3 Direct .5000 .3500 .1500
4 Direct .5500 .3500 .1500
5 Direct .5500 .1500 .1000
6 Direct .4500 .1053 .0500
7 Direct .3500 .2500 .0000
8 Direct .5500 .1500 .0500
9 Direct .4500 .1000 .1000
10 Direct .3000 .3684 .0500
11 Direct .5000 .2000 .0000
12 Direct .5000 .2500 .0500
13 Direct .5000 .3000 .1500
14 Direct .5000 .3500 .1500
15 Direct .6500 .3000 .0500
16 Direct .3000 .3000 .1000
17 Direct .3158 .3500 .1500
18 Direct .6000 .4211 .0500
Mean 0.4731 0.2525 0.0806
SD
19 Indirect .3000 .4000 .2000
20 Indirect .2500 .2632 .0500
21 Indirect .3500 .1000 .0500
22 Indirect .2500 .2500 .0500
23 Indirect .3500 .3158 .0000
24 Indirect .3000 .2000 .0500
25 Indirect .3000 .1579 .0500
26 Indirect .3500 .5000 .0000
27 Indirect .4500 .3000 .0500
28 Indirect .1500 .4500 .1500
29 Indirect .3000 .1000' .0500
30 Indirect .2000 .2500 .0000
31 Indirect .5000 .3500 .1500
32 Indirect .2500 .1500 .1000
33 Indirect .2500 .1500 .0000
34 Indirect .2000 .1500 .1000
35 Indirect .2000 .2105 .1500
36 Indirect .3158 .4500 .0500
Mean 0.2925 0.2637 0.0694
SD
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Table E2.
Mean Proportion of Completions for Each Word Type on the Direct Test in
Experiment 2 That Were Reported as Guessed, and the Proportion of These
Completions That Were Also Correct.
pG pC pCG
s Sem NSem Dist Sem NSem Dist Sem NSem Dist
1 .250 1.000 .900 .000 .150 .100 .000 .150 .111
2 .450 .600 .632 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
3 .100 .250 .300 .000 .050 .050 .000 .200 .167
4 .100 .200 .350 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
5 .500 .900 .850 .050 .100 .100 .100 .111 .118
6 .450 .842 .950 .000 .053 .050 .000 .063 .053
7 .600 .750 1.000 .000 .050 .000 .000 .067 .000
8 .200 .650 .600 .000 .050 .050 .000 .077 .083
9 .600 .600 .850 .050 .000 .100 .083 .000 .118
10 .600 .650 .800 .000 .211 .000 .000 .324 .000
11 .350 .750 .579 .000 .100 .000 .000 .133 .000
12 .200 .600 .650 .000 .150 .000 .000 .250 .000
13 .300 .750 .950 .000 .150 .150 .000 , .200 .158
14 .500 .850 1.000 .050 .200 .150 .100 .235 .150
15 .200 .400 .550 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
16 .350 .450 .750 .000 .200 .100 .000 .444 .133
17 .100 .350 .350 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
18 .250 .400 .500 .000 .053 .000 .000 .132 .000
Mean .339 .611 .698 .008 .084 .047 .016 .133 .061
SD .176 .229 .230 .019 .076 .056 .036 .126 .067
Note: pG = Proportion of guessed completions, pC = proportion of guessed
completions that were also correct, pCG = pC/pG.
Table E3.
Frequency of Use of Each Confidence Rating (0. 1. 2. 3. and 4) for Direct Test Completion of Semantically Processed Words.
Nonsemantically Processed Words, and Distractor Words in Experiment 2.
Semantic Nonsemantic Distracter
s 0 1 2 3 4 0 I 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
1 .250 .050 .050 .150 .500 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .900 .050 .050 .000 .000
2 .450 .250 .000 .150 .150 .600 .250 .100 .000 .050 .632 .316 .053 .000 .000
3 .100 .150 .250 .050 .450 .250 .350 .100 .200 .100 .300 .500 .200 .000 .000
4 .100 .200 .200 .100 .400 .200 .300 .250 .200 .050 .350 .350 .150 .150 .000
5 .500 .050 .000 .100 .350 .850 .100 .000 .000 .050 .850 .150 .000 .000 .000
6 .450 .050 .000 .000 .500 .842 .053 .105 .000 .000 .950 .000 .050 .000 .000
7
.600 .050 .000 .000 .350 .750 .100 .000 .000 .150 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
8 .200 .050 .100 .150 .500 .650 .150 .100 .050 .050 .600 .350 .000 .000 .050
9 .600 .000 .000 .000 .400 .600 .300 .050 .000 .200 .850 .150 .000 .000 .000
10 .600 .050 .000 .100 .250 .684 .263 .053 .000 .000 .800 .100 .100 .000 .000
11 .350 .100 .000 .050 .500 .750 .200 .000 .000 .050 .579 .211 .105 .053 .053
12 .200 .300 .050 .200 .250 .600 .250 .050 .050 .050 .650 .200 .100 .000 .050
13 .300 .250 .000 .100 .350 .750 .100 .050 .050 .050 .950 .050 .000 .000 .000
14 .500 .000 .000 .050 .450 .850 .000 .000 .050 .100 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
15 .200 .150 .000 .200 .450 .400 .400 .050 .000 .150 .550 .400 .050 .000 .000
16 .350 .150 .050 .100 .350 .450 .200 .200 .100 .050 .750 .150 .000 .100 .000
17 .105 .316 .105 .158 .316 .350 .150 .150 .250 .100 .350 .450 .150 .050 .000
18 .250 .150 .100 .250 .250 .421 .211 .263 .105 .000 .500 .400 .100 .000 .000
Mean .339 .129 .050 .160 .376 .611 .188 .085 .059 .067 .698 .213 .062 .020 .009
SD .176 .101 .075 .073 .104 .225 .115 .084 .081 .057 .230 .166 .063 .043 .020
o
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Unconscious influences, 2
Summary
From intense interest in implicit memory has evolved various methodologies for
separating the respective influence of implicit(unconscious)and explicit (conscious)
processeson performance of various tasks. Two experiments are reported that utilised
a levels of processing (LOP) approach to manipulate encoding level and comparable
indirect (word stem completion) and direct (cued completion) retention tests.
Confidence ratings of recollection were taken for each direct test response. The aim of
these experiments was to explore the role guessing plays on direct test performance
(Experiment 1 and 2) and to contrast this with performance on a comparable indirect
test (Experiment 2). Analysisof correctly guessed responses showed that direct test
performance was reliably influencedby unconscious processes,but differentially as a
function of LOP. Guessing stems of nonsemantically processed words was found to
enhance performance whereas guessingstems of semantically processed words had no
affect on performance. Results are discussed in terms of the similarity between,
guessing on a direct test and engaging in an indirect test, and subjects' unwitting
resourcefulness at being able to "retrieve" words they cannot explicitly remember.
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Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a substantial change in the direction of memory
research reflected in the now well-known distinction between explicit and implicit
memory (Grafand Schacter, 1985; Schacter, 1987). Explicit memory is testedby asking
subjects to remember items froma listofpreviously studied words or pictures, and is
held to require the intentionalor conscious recollection of the study episodeand its
contents. The explicitmemory paradigm has been the dominant approach for
exploring memory phenomena thiscentury. Implicit memory, by contrast, is tested
incidentally by looking for evidenceof savingsor facilitation of performancefollowing
a study episode. For implicit memory, a subject is not required to explicitly
remember, and may evenbe unable torecall, the study episodeand its contents. Thus,
implicit memory is thought to be based on unintentional or unconscious processesor
influences.
The discovery in recent years of a myriad of dissociations between performance
on direct and indirect tests has given rise to much explanatory theorising and
speculation (see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger, 1990; Roediger &
McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 1987; Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993; Shimamura, 1986
for reviews). One well-established dissociation is found for the depth or level of
processing (LOP) at study. Craik and Lockhart (1972) and Craik and Tulving (1975)
were the first to operationalise and demonstrate the now ubiquitous effect that deep or
semantic processing, achieved by directing attention to meaningful attributes of
stimuli (e.g., rating the meaningfulnessof a word), elicitsa higher levelof performance
on direct tests than does shallow or nonsemantic processing, achieved by directing
attention to structural features of stimuli (e.g.,counting the number of enclosed spaces
in the letters of a word). In contrast, most research points to LOP having little or no
effect on performance across a number ofindirect tests' (e.g.. Bowers &Schacter, 1990;
Graf & Mandler, 1984; Graf, Mandler, & Haden, 1982;Hashtroudi, Ferguson, Rappold,
& Chrosniak, 1988;Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Light & Singh, 1987; Roediger, Weldon,
Stadler, & Riegler, 1992; Schacter &McGlynn, 1989), however, a large review of the
literature by Challis and Brodbeck (1992) clearly showed that a small but reliable LOP
effect is evident in almost all implicit studies.
The heuristic value of the dissociation approach is weakened, however, if tasks
used to argue for dissociation effects are not themselves process or factor pure
measures. Current thought attests to the fact that direct and direct tests are rarely
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process or factor pure measures (Jacoby, 1991;Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993;
Joordens & Merikie, 1993; Nelson, Schreiber, & McEvoy, 1992). For indirect tests,
where subjects are asked to complete word stems with the first word that comes to
mind, some authors have claimed that intentional retrieval processes may
"contaminate" performance and therefore lead to increased overall correct completion
levels (Light and Singh, 1987; Sclracter, Bowers, & Booker, 1989), and recently a few
investigations have explicitly addressed the effects of "contamination" of unconscious
influences on direct or direct tests (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Jacoby et al., 1993; Nelson et
al., 1992). Hie objective of the present study is to use the LOP approach to further
investigate the cognitive processes involved in performing the direct cued completion
task. The optimistic aim of this type of research is to devise improved factor pure tests
of conscious and unconscious influences on performance. The conservative and
perhaps more realistic aim is to determine the magnitude of the respective influences
of the two types of processes.
One stream of research by Jacoby and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al.,
1993) employs a process dissociation methodology with "inclusion" and "exclusion"
tests for separating out the respective magnitude of explicit and implicit processes on
memory performance. In a study typical of this approach, Jacoby et al. (1993)
manipulated attention at study (e.g., full versus divided) and presented word stems as
cues at test. In the exclusion condition, subjects were instructed to respond with the
first word that comes to mind, but to exclude words they were previously shown. For
the inclusion condition, subjects were encouraged to try to remember words, and to
write the first word that comes to mind if they could not remember. By assuming that
explicit and implicit processes make independent contributions to performance and by
solving rather simple simultaneous equations, the magnitude of implicit influences on
a direct test can be measured.
Another study by Gardiner (1988) manipulated LOP at study and used
recognition as a direct test and reported results which were interpreted as showing
both implicit and explicit contributions to direct test performance. In this study,
subjects were required to indicate which words they remembered the appearance of in
the study list ("R" words) and which they did not remember the appearance of but
nonetheless recognised or knew by some other means ("K" words). A dissociation
was found between the type of recognised word as a function of LOP and parallels
were drawn between "R" words and explicit processes and "K" words and implicit
processes. This cpnclusion, however, may not be warranted. For example, although
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"R" words may stem from episodic memory, the (ostensibly) non-episodic nature of
"K" words does not imply their recognition was not based on explicit processes.
Indeed, all "R" and "K" words were first consciously recollected before being
categorised as such.
Nelson et al. (1992) have defined implicit memories as "preexisting memories
acquired before the laboratory task in the hundreds of experiences that people have
with the same stimulus in different contexts" (p. 322). These authors consider that
such memories qualify as implicit because "subjects are typically unaware of their
activation during encoding and retrieval and because they are unaware of the effects
that these memories have on their performance" (p. 323). Nelson et al. (1992)
investigated the involvement of implicit processes in direct tests by manipulating
target and test-cue set size. Set size refers to the number of associates which, as a
result of experience, are linked to a particular stimulus. Set size effectsare observed
when differences in memory performance are found for large versus small target or
cue stimulus sets. Generally, the larger the cue or target set size, and hence the more
preexisting associates, the lower the probability of recall, and conversely, the smaller
the set size, the greater the probability of recall. Fuelled by set size effect findings for
(direct) extralist cuing tasks. Nelson et al. (1992) have devised a Processing Implicit
and Explicit Representations (PIER) model which describes an exclusive parallel
relationship between implicit and explicit processes to explain retrieval. An
interesting feature of this model is that it predicts that implicit influences on direct
tests should systematically vary with instructions that emphasise use of one or both
parallel pathways. In one experiment (Experiment 4), Nelson et al. (1992) showed that
when subjects had to guess words they could not explicitly remember (explicit plus
implicit pathway) overall performance was higher than when subjects were instructed
to be very sure their response was correct (explicit pathway only).
There are clear similarities between the process dissociation framework of Jacoby
(1991) and Nelson et al.'s (1992) set size framework. The approach taken in this study
shares similarities witli all these approaches devised to measure unconscious
influences on direct tests but differs in the manner in which unconscious processes are
measured. In the present study, an estimate of the magnitude of unconscious
influences was directly obtained by determining the proportion of words correctly
completed when self-reported conscious recollection is completely absent and subjects
have to guess responses. If subjects do not explicitly remember a word but are
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required tosupplya response anyway, subjects' guesses mayengage thesame
cognitive processes engaged during an indirect test.
Converging evidence from studies of subliminalperception, which is in many
wayscomparable to implicit memory (Kihlstrom, 1987), is consistent with the view
that guessing is a kind of indirect testforinformation renderedsubliminal (e.g., Dixon,
1971). Indeed, instructions to guess defined the earliest subliminal perception test
(Sidis, 1898). More direct evidencecomesfrom a recentstudy by Gabrieli, Milberg,
Keane, and Corkin (1990) which showed that cued completion performance for the
densely amnesic subject H.M. wasbetterthan for normalcontrol subjects (33.3%
versus 23.5%, respectively). Because anterograde amnesics cannotexplicitly remember
study items, this result shows that when noinformation isavailable toguide explicit
retrieval, a direct test can become a sensitive measure of unconscious processes (i.e.,
an indirect test).
Nonsemanticallyprocessing informationalso leads to poor explicitrecollection
for normal subjects (Craik &Tulving, 1975) which Grafet al. (1982) have argued
"mirrors" anterograde amnesia (p. 1244). Thus, onemightalsoexpect informed
guessing tocontribute substantially tocued completion ofnonsemantically processed
information in normal subjects. Graf,Squire, and Mandler (1984, Experiment 3)
compared amnesic and amnesic control subjects for cuedcompletion performance and
reported no difference for nonsemantic processing (39.6% versus 39.9%, respectively)
but a small difference for semantically processed words (57.7% versus 69.0%,
respectively), which suggests thatsimilar (informed guessing) processes maybe
employed by both amnesics and control subjects, at leastforcompletions of
nonsemantically processed words. Clearly,amnesics do benefit from informed
guessing ofboth semantically and nonsemantically processed information, but the
problem in interpreting the direct testresults fornormal subjects iscomplicated
because we do not know which responses are guessed and which ones are
remembered.
The effectof guessing on direct test performance is an important issue that
warrants investigation with a number ofdifferent methodologies. Onemight attempt
to address the issue of informed guessing directly by asking subjects to refrain from
responding if theyare unsureof their direct test responses (e.g., Graf&Mandler, 1984;
Hashtroudi et al., 1988; Roediger et al., 1992; Weldon, Roediger, &Challis, 1989). This
procedure, however, apart from precluding the analysis ofhow guessing mightaffect
performance may introduce response bias. If subjects are instructed to respond to
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every stem for the indirect test but are not permitted to guess direct test responses,
cmydissociation between direct and indirect test performance may simply reflect
criterion differences m responding between the two tests rather than different
underlying processes (Merikle & Reingold, 1991). The approach taken in this study - a
direct analysis of guessed direct test completions - has not previously been
undertaken. In the two experiments which follow, direct test responses labelled by
subjects as not remembered and guessed were analysed in order to determine the
extent to which correct completion of guessed words contributes to overall
performance, and how this may vary as a function of LOP at study. Experiment 1 was
a preliminary attempt to establish the existence of tlie informed guessing effect for
normal^subjects. Experiment 2 was then undertaken to quantify this effect in a more
precise and elaborate way by using (i) both direct and indirect tests with which to
compare performance, (ii) random presentation of study tasks, and (iii) a more
stringent criterion for guessing.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects and design
Twelve subjects aged 17 to 31 (M = 20.089, SD = 4.730) were recruited. Subjects
were first year psycliology students from the University of Tasmania who received
course credit for participation. The experimental design was completely within
subjects with Word Type (semantic, nonsemantic, and distractor) as the only factor.
Materials
Words were obtained from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981).
Tliis database comprises an extensive collection of words and associated normative
data on, for example, ratings of frequency of occurrence, familiarity, concreteness,
imageability, and meaningfulness for each word. The criteria for selecting words was
adopted from Graf and Mandler (1984) such that (i) each word had six letters, (ii) the
first three letters of each word uniquely defmed that word in the list, (iii) words had a
low Kucera-Francis (Kucera & Francis, 1967) frequency of occurrence, and (iv) the
three letter stem of each word was shared by at least 10 other dictionary words.
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Froma pool of 98words, 72 words wereselected with Kucera-Francis
frequencies of14occurrences per million or less. Sixty words were randomly
allocated to one of three lists (List A, List B, or List C) each comprising 20 words, and
the remaining12words were used as fillers. Nosignificant differences were found
between word lists for any of the normative data. An additional list of 10high Kucera-
Francis frequency words wereused as practice items. Lists were permutated (i.e.,
ABC, BCA,CAB, BAC, ACB, and CBA) so that each list equally often served as the
semantic study list, nonsemantic studylist, anddistractor list, and wasequally often
preceded and followed by different lists.
Words and word stems were presented by an IBM compatible computer on to
the computer's monitor. All responses were made on lined studyand test forms
provided, one response per line.
Procedure
Subjects were testedindividually in a soundattenuated room. Subjects were
comfortably seated600 mmfrom the monitor screen so that stimuli subtended
approximately 1.8degrees of visual angle.
For thestudy phase, subjects werepresented with two consecutive listsof 31
words. Each subject performeda semantic study task on one of the lists and a
nonsemantic study taskon the other. The orderoftaskswas counterbalanced across
subjects. The first 5 words in each listserved aspractice items and the next3 and last
3 words on each list served as filler items to counter primacy and recency effects.
Thus, only20 words on eachlistserved as target words and only the stems of these
and 20 new distractor words were used in the test phase. The temporal sequence of
events for the study phase was (i)500Hz tone (50 ms), (ii)pause (500 ms), (ill)
presentationofstudy word (3000 ms, Hashtroudi et al., 1988), and (iv) pause (500 ms).
Subjects made their response during the3000 msword presentation period.
Instructions for the two processing tasks wereadapted from Graf and Mandler
(1984). Thesemantic processing task required subjects to rate along a 5-pointscale
how much they liked the meaningof the word presented. On this scale,"1" equalled
"don't like at all" and "5" equalled "like a lot." The nonsemantic processing task
required subjects to count thenumberofenclosed spaces in the lettersof the word
presented. Subjects' responses were checkedbefore they commenced the study task
proper to ensure that they followed instructions.
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Immediately following the study phase, subject's retention performance was
assessed by a cued completion direct test. For this test, tlie first three letters of the 40
target words and 20new distractor words were presented randomly interspersed, and
subjects were required to use the letters as cues to help them recall words from the
study lists. If subjectshad to guess their responses, they were asked to indicate that
they had guessed by placing an asterisk next to their completion. The temporal
sequenceof events for the test phase was (i) buttonpress, (ii) pause (500 ms), and (iii)
presentation ofword stem. Thetestphasewasself paced; subjects completed their
response then pressed a button to initiate the next trial. However,subjects were also
encouraged to respond as quickly as possible without compromising accuracy.
•i,
Results and Discussion
The levelof significance adopted for all statistical analyses was a < .05. Where
variables revealing significant main effects also entered into a significant interaction,
only the interaction effect was further analysed. All planned comparisons between
means were evaluated with two-tailed tests, and all t-tests were matched or paired
unless otherwise indicated.
The proportion of correct completions as a function of Word Type (semantic,
nonsemantic, and distractor) are presented in Table 1. To compare the direct test
results of this study with those from other studies where subjects were not permitted
to guess their direct test responses (e.g.,Graf and Mandler, 1984; Hashtroudi et al.,
1988; Roediger et al., 1992), a second condition was created by excluding all guessed
data. Data for this new condition is also shown in Table 1.
The proportion of (nonstudied) distractor stems "correctly" completed provides
a baseline measure of the proportion of stems correctly completed by chance alone. To
adjust for chance, this figure was subtracted from the proportion of correct
completions for both semantically and nonsemantically processed words.
Insert Table 1 about here
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Table 1 shows that after removing guessed data, correct completion drops
markedly for nonsemantically processed words but has little effect on semantically
processed words. These values closely resemble those from published studies where
guessing was not permitted on the direct test (Graf and Mandler, 1984; Hashtroudi et
al., 1988). Prior to adjustment for chance, the change for nonsemantically processed
words (.204 - .067 = .137) was highly significant [t(ll) = 7.021, p < .0001], but after
chance adjustment, this change (.113- .063= .05)did not quite reach significance [i(ll)
= 2.002, p = .071]. Thus, guessing clearly contributes to direct test performance, but
differentially as a function of LOP. A closer inspection of this differential effect
follows.
Table 2 displays the proportion of responses for each word type that were
reported as guessed as well as the proportion of these responses that were also correct
(i.e., correct guesses divided by total guesses).
Insert Table 2 about here
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on the total proportion of guessed
completions revealed a significant effect of Word Type [(F(2,22) = 86.929, p < .0001].
Significantly fewer semantically processed words were guessed than nonsemantically
processed words [t(ll) = 11.504, p <.0001] and distractor words [t(ll) = 9.052, p,<
.0001], but the latter two did not significantly differ from each other [t(ll) = .248, nsl.
This result shows that no advantage was gained for nonsemantic processing over and
above no processing in terms of explicit recollection.
For guessed responses that were also correct, a second ANOVA also revealed a
significant effect of Word Type [F(2,22) = 6.343,p = .007]. Although the level of
completion of semantically processed words and distractor words did not significantly
differ [t(ll) = 1.310, ns], significantly more nonsemantically processed words were
completed than either semantically processed words [1(11) = 3.347, p = . 007] or
distractor words [t(ll) = 2.238, p = .047]. Thus, when completions were guessed,
completions of nonsemantically processed words were more likely to be correct tlian
were completions of semantically processed words or distractor words. This result
demonstrates that direct test completion of nonsemantically processed words is
influenced by unconscious processes. 17.8% of guessed completions of
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nonsemantically processed words were correct, a figure significantly larger than what
would be expected by chance alone (10.4%). In real terms, this amounts to an increase
in direct test performance of about 13.7% prior to adjusting for chance correct
completionsor 5.0% aftersubtracting forchance. Thus,it appears that subjects can be
unwittingly resourceful in completing a task for whichno consciousinformation is
available provided that information is minimally processedat study and guessing is
permitted at test. Experiment 2 was undertaken toquantify this effect in a more
rigorous manner.
In Experiment 1, study tasks were presented within subjects as two
counterbalanced blocks of trials. This is how study tasks are often presented in
implicit memory research. Recent work byChallis and Brodbeck (1992), however, has
shown that blocked study designs can lead to task-specific or context (e.g., cognitive
"set") effects which contribute to LOP-based dissociation effects. These authors
showed that when semantic and nonsemantic tasks were presented blocked within
subjectsor as a betweensubjects factor, indirect testperformance was better following
semantic processing but when tasks were presented mixed within subjects, no LOP
effect was found. Challis and Brodbeck (1992), drawing upon the work of Weldon
(1991) who reported that lexical processing is essential for priming, suggested that
blocked or between subject presentations may discourage complete lexical processing
in the nonsemantic condition becausesubjects may learn to pay little attention to the
words as a whole, but only to structural aspects of them. Mixed within subjects
designs, on the other hand, becauseof the unpredictabilityof the tasks, may encourage
more thorough lexicalprocessing prior to additional semantic or nonsemantic
processing. In Experiment2, study tasks were randomly presented within subjects in
an effort to determine whether cognitive set effects contributed to LOP-based
informed guessing effects found in the direct test of Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 also trialed a new 5-point confidencerating scale as a method of
obtaining subjective information about whichdirect test responses were guessed. This
rating method was favoured because it permits use of a morestringent criterion for
guessing, and it may reduce the likelihood of response bias contributing to dissociation
effects (see discussion in introduction). Reductions in response bias might be expected
because a rating scale of this type permits subjects the option of indicating the degree
to which they are unsure about their responses rather than simply omitting them (as in
some previous studies) or dichotomously grouping them (as in Experiment 1).
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Experiment 2
Method
Subjects and design
Thirty six subjects aged 17 to 28 (M = 19.394, SD = 2.065) were recruited.
Subjects were first year psychology students from the University of Tasmania who
received course credit for participation. The experimental design conformed to a 3 X 2
mixed format with Word Type (semantic, nonsemantic, and distractor) as a within
subjects factor and Retention Test (direct or indirect) 'as a between subjects factor.
Materials
The materials were the same as for Experiment 1 except for the following
modifications: (i) Because the direct and indirect nature of the tests given to subjects
rests critically on the instructions supplied (Graf & Mandler, 1984; Merikle & Reingold,
1991;Schacter et al., 1989), all instructions were standardised across subjects by
presenting them by audio cassette, and (ii) a 5-point confidence rating scale was used
to determine which direct test responses were guessed and which were not guessed.
Procedure
The procedure was also similar to Experiment 1 with the following alterations.
A new random allocation of words to lists A, B,and G was undertaken. During the
study phase, subjects were presented with 62 words. The first 10 words served as
practice items and the next 6 and last 6 words served as filler items. The remaining 40
words comprised two lists of 20 target words each. Only the stems of these target
words and 20 new distractor words were used in the test phase. Each subject
performed a semantic processing task on one of the lists and a nonsemantic processing
task on the other. The order of presentation of the two tasks was random.
Prior to each trial an instructional cue appeared centrally on the screen to
indicate which processing task the subjectwas to perform on the forthcoming study
word. For the semantic processing task, the boxed cue "rate likability" appeared on
the screen and for the nonsemantic processing task, the boxed cue "count enclosed
spaces" appeared. The most appropriate exposure duration for the task cues was
selected on the basis of a pilot work. Unlike the blocked and counterbalanced
presentation of study tasks in Experiment 1, the study tasks in this experiment were
randomly presented. The temporal sequence of events for the study phase was: (i)
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500 Hz tone (50 ms), (ii) task cue (4000ms), (iii) pause (500ms), (iv) presentation of
study word (3000ms), and (v) pause (500ms). Subjects made their responses during
the 3000 ms presentation time and were alerted to the start of the next trial by the 500
Hz tone.
For the test phase the temporal sequence of events and the presentation of word
stems was the same as for Experiment 1. Subjects in the indirect test condition were
told to write down the very first word they could think of, excluding proper nouns,
which completed the stem. Instructions for the direct test were the same as for
Experiment 1 except subjects were instructed to respond to every trial even if they
could not remember a word from the list that goes with the stem and, after making
their response, to rate along a scale from 0 to 4 how confident they were that their
response was a word that they remember. On this scale,0 equalled "Don't remember
at all; a complete guess" and 4 equalled "Clearly remember."
Results and Discussion
Priming and dissociation effects
For each word type, the proportion of correct completions and the proportion of
chance adjusted correct completions for direct and indirect tests are shown in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here
For the indirect test, significantly more semantically processed words [i(17) =
8.573, p < .0001] and nonsemantically processed words [t(ll) = 6.413, p < .0001] were
correctly completed than were distractor words, the completion rate of which
represents chance level performance. Thus, significant priming occurred for both
semantically processed words and nonsemantically processed words.
The chance adjusted data was analysed by a 2 (LOP) X 2 (Retention Test) mixed
design ANOVA which revealed a significant main effect of LOP [F(l,34) = 24.161, p <
.0001] and Retention Test [F(l,34) = 7.116, p = .012], and a significant LOP X Retention
Test interaction [F(l,34) = 14.290,p = .0006]. Further analysis of this interaction
revealed (i) no significant effect of LOP on the indirect test [t(17) = .877, ns], (ii)
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significcintly more completions of semantically processed words than nonsemanticaliy
processed words on the direct test [t(17) = 5.702, p < .0001], (iii) significantly more
direct test completions than indirect test completions for semantically processed
words [t(34) = 4.669, p < .0001, unmatched t], and (iv) no significant effect of Retention
Test for rionsemantically processed words [t(34) = .582, ns, unmatched tj.
This analysis shows that performance on the indirect test was relatively
insensitive to LOP at study whereas direct test performance is highly sensitive to LOP.
It also replicates the pattern of direct test results observed in Experiment 1 and shows
that retaining guessed data leads to a level of performance for nonsemanticaliy
processed words that is the same irrespective of whether a direct test or an indirect
test is given. Finally, although the magnitude of direct test performance is somewhat
lower in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2 (compare Tables 1 and 3), the LOP effects
are the same (+.225 and +.220 respectively). That is, the change in the design of the
study phase, from within subjects blocked in Experiment 1 to within subjects random
in Experiment 2, appears not to alter the pattern of results.
Analysis of confidence ratings
The confidence rating scale permits the categorisation of responses as "guessed"
or "remembered" according to different criteria. Because we were interested in
informed guessing hypothesised to take place when no conscious information is
available to assist retrieval, we chose to adopt a stringent criterion to define a guess.
This criterion accepts that only responses rated 0 (i.e., "Don't remember at all; a
complete guess") be considered guessed, on the basis that a rating of 1 or more
indicates uncertainty or the possible presence of conscious information that may be
used to guide retrieval. Conversely, only responses rated 4 (i.e., "Clearly remember")
were accepted as remembered on the basis that a rating of anything less than 4
indicates uncertainty or familiarity rather than explicit recollection. The pattern of use
of confidence ratings for all completions as a function of Word Type are shown in
Figure 1.
hisert Figure 1 about here
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Inspection of Figure 1 illustrates thatratings of0 (i.e., guessed) and ratings of4
(i.e., remembered) accountedfora largeproportionof all ratings made whereas the
intermediate or "uncertain" ratings of 1, 2, and 3 were used much less often. The
percentage of responses rated either 0 or 4was 71.5%, 67.8%, and 70.6% (M= 70.0%)
for semantically processed,nonsemantically processed, and distractor words,
respectively. This clearly represents a nonsignificant effect ofWord Type [F(2,34) =
.789, ns] and establishes that subjects were equallyconfident about their use of
extreme ratings (0 and 4) foreachword type. That is, there was no biasamong
subjects toward adopting different response criteria for designating completions for
any word typeas extreme. This conclusion attests to the validity ofcomparing each
word type for thefrequency ofuse ofextreme ratings and thesignificance wehave
ascribed to them.
Analysis of guessed data
Table 4 displays the proportion of responses foreach word type that were
designated as guessed (i.e., correct completions that received a confidence rating of0)
and the proportions of these responses that were alsocorrect (i.e., correctguesses
divided by total guesses).
Insert Table 4 about here
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on theguessed data showed a
significant effect of Word Type[F(2,34) = 51.129, p < .0001]. Significantly fewer
semantically processedwords were guessed than were nonsemantically processed
words [t(17) = 6.092, p <.0001] and distractor words [t(17) = 10.334, p < .0001], and
significantly fewernonsemantically processed words were guessed than distractor
words [t(17) = 2.879, p = .010]. Thisresult shows that substantially less information
was available to guide retrieval of nonsemantically processed words than for
semanticallyprocessed words. Comparison of Tables 2 and 4 shows that overall levels
of guessingare lower m Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. Thisdifference, and the
finding that some advantage was gained for nonsemantic processing over no
processing in terms of awareness of study words in Experiment 2 but not in
Experiment 1, probably reflects the differing criteria used to define a guess between
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the twoexperiments. Thestringentcriterion ofExperiment 2 excluded ratingsof 1
whichmight conceivably have been included in Experiment 1, thus leading to an
increase in total guessing rates, especially fordistractorwords which were typically
rated 0 or 1 (see Figure 1).
Forcorrectly guessed completions, a final ANOVA revealed a significant effect
ofWord Type [F(2,34) = 10.746, p = .0002]. There we.fe significantly morecorrectly
guessed responses ofnonsemantically processed words thandistractor words [t(17) =
2.590, p = .019] andsignificantly more correctly guessed responses ofdistractor words
than semantically processedwords [t(17) = 3.192, p = .005]. Furthermore, the
proportion ofcorrectly guessed semantically processed words wasnot significantly
greater than zero [t(17) = 1.836, ns]- These results replicate the correct guessing results
ofExperiment 1in showing thatwhen completions were guessed, completions of
nonsemantically processed words were more likely to becorrect thancompletions of
semantically processed words or distractor words. This result adds additional weight
to the conclusion that overall direct test performance is reliably influencedby the
involvement of unconscious processes. With a larger subject sample and a more
stringent criterion for guessing, this experiment also reveals that correct guessing of
semantically processed words issubstantially worse than chance and no better than
zero. Thus, informed guessingdoesnot influence cued completion of semantically
processed words. The fact that these results based onrandom presentation ofstudy
tasksreplicate Experiment 1 resultsbasedon counterbalanced blocked presentation
also demonstrates that it is trial-by-trial information that is critical in attaining these
results rather than any context or cognitive set effects.
A final point to note is that although the confidence rating scaleused in
Experiment 2 is arguably a more sensitive method forcategorising guessed responses
than the dichotomous scale of Experiment 1 (i.e., there is less likelihood of
contaminating0 ratings with uncertainty), the results of Experiment1 are consistent
with the results of Experiment 2.
General Discussion
Although, blocked study task designs for indirect tests appear to encourage
context or set effects resulting in an increased LOP effect (Challis & Brodbeck, 1992),
the study task design of the direct test does not appear to affecton the size of the LOP
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effect. The finding that the direct test LOP effect was tlie same between Experiment 1
and 2 despite different study task designs discourages the view that dissociation and
informed guessing effects are due to context or cognitive set effects inherent in
processing tasks in general rather than to encoding of item-specific information on
each study trial. If a blocked set of nonsemantically processed words elicits
incomplete lexical processing at study (Challis & Brodbeck, 1992), it is logical that this
would pose more of a problem for indirect tests, where lexical processing and physical
similarity between study and test stimuli is most important (Weldon, 1991), than for
direct tests where physical similarity appears less important (e.g.. Nelson et al. 1992).
In any case, the present results supply greater confidence that the informed guessing
effects discussed further below are reliable and robust.
Of particular importance to the aims and hypotheses of this study was a close
analysis of those direct test responses that subjects guessed. Results from both
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a substantially larger proportion of nonsemantically
processed words and distractor words were guessed than semantically processed
words. Consistent with the ubiquitous finding that LOP at study affects direct test
performance (Craik & Tulving, 1975), this result confirms that considerably more
information related to the explicit (conscious) retrievability of words is available
following semantic processing than following nonsemantic processing. Because direct
tests were traditionally thought to measure intentional or conscious influences on
performance, measurable unconscious influences on direct test performance is a far
more interesting finding. A minimal assumption in interpreting evidence for
unconscious perception in the present study was that above chance correct guessing
on the direct test reflects unconscious influences. The viability of this assumption rests
first on the validity of accepting a subjective report as reflecting an absence of
conscious experience, and second on the logic of defining a guess as when such an
absence of conscious experience occurred at the time of test.
Although subjective measures of awareness have been severely criticised in
f.'
favour of more objective measures (e.g., Holender, 1986), it is now clear that
"subjective measures are the only class of measures that have consistently led to
successful demonstrations of perception without awareness" (Merikle, 1992, p. 793-
794, see also Greenwald, 1992). In terms of the current study, subjective measures are
clearly the relevant ones to use because they reveal what is and what is not available to
consciousness. In Experiment 1, however, where subjects used a forced-choice
dichotomous rating scale to designate guessed responses, there is some question as to
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whether a guess always conformed to the strict definition of no conscious awareness.
With the 5-point confidence rating scale used in Experiment 2, however, we felt more
certain that responses that we classified as "guessed" reflected a complete absence of
conscious experience. With this more stringent criterion, results showed that correct
guessing of nonsemantically processed words remained significantly greater than
/ i-
chance level performance, thereby establishing the presence of unconscious influences.
The results observed with the "analysis of guessing" methodology used in this
study corroborate with results from studies using other methodologies aimed at
separating conscious from unconscious influences within a specific task. Both Jacoby's
(1991) process dissociation approach and Nelson et al.'s (1992) PIER model make
assumptions about the relationship between implicit and explicit processes. The
process dissociation approach assumes that implicit and explicit processes are
independent of each other but that there may be some degree of overlap (Jacoby et al.,
1993). The PIER model also assumes independence but defines a more mutually
exclusive relationship between implicit and explicit processes with no overlap (Jacoby
et al., 1993). However, Jacoby et al. (1993) concede that there is likely to be little
difference in predictions between the two models. The analysis of guesses approach
adopted in this study does not make any assumptions about the relationship between
implicit and explicit processes, however it does share a similarity with the exclusion
task methodology of the process dissociation approach in that it attempts to eliminate
any contribution of explicit processes prior to measuring an implicit effect. Explicit
processes are eliminated in the exclusion task by asking subjects to exclude responses
they remember from the study list and explicit processes were excluded in the present
study by using only responses with memory confidence ratings of zero. In terms of
ensuring no contamination by explicit processes, it is reasonable to consider the
approach taken in this study to be at least as reliable as the process dissociation
approach.
The approach used in this study shares additional similarities with the process
dissociation model and Gardiner's (1988) "remember-know" approach inasmuch as
data from each study comprises subjective estimates of recollective experience.
Strictly speaking, almost all memory studies measure subjective data, but subjective
data is a particularly salient feature of the design of the present study and the study of
Gardiner (1988). In both studies, subjects were asked to make decisions about the
strength or salience of subjective events based on criteria set by task instructions.
Gardiner (1988) required subjects to discern whether their conscious recollections
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could be categorised as episodic or nonepisodic. In the present study, subjects were
required to discern whether their recollective experience was strong, weak, or absent.
Presumably a similar subjective process is required for deciding whether a target item
qualifies as remembered or not remembered in Jacoby's (1991) exclusion task.
The present study also revealed that the measurable influence of unconscious
processes on direct test performance varies as a function of LOP at study.
Furthermore, the finding from both experiments that there was no significant
difference across tests for completion of nonsemantically processed words when
guesses were included as data is consistent with the view that a direct test on
nonsemantically processed information when guessing is permitted is analogous to an
indirect test of this information (cf. Merikle & Reingold, 1991). Thus, guessing may
engage the same cognitive processes as does thinking of the first word that comes to
mind. This reasoning is consistent with the finding from the subliminal perception
literature that guessing is like an indirect test for information rendered subliminal
(e.g., Dixon, 1971), and corroborates with the results of Gabrieli et al. (1990) and Graf
et al. (1984) with normal subjects. The informed guessing that amnesic subjects readily
demonstrate for both semantically processed and nonsemantically processed words,
may parallel the informed guessing that normal subjects show, except normal subjects
do not seem to benefit from guessing semantically processed words. The most
parsimonious explanation for these seemingly disparate results is that it is only when
little or no information is available to guide retrieval that informed guessing comes
into play. For amnesic subjects this may be the rule, but for normal subjects, this
might only occur when information has been minimally processed. When some
information is available to guide retrieval (i.e., after semantic processing), unconscious
influences in normal subjects may be inhibited. Together, these findings stress the
importance of a close analysis of direct test responses which subjects claim they do not
remember. If subjects do not remember but are required to make a response anyway,
unconscious influences may unwittingly enhance performance.
It is important to note that the informed guessing effects that we measured in
this study might not be the only unconscious influence on direct test performance.
The present study was concerned with measuring a small subset of correct direct test
responses which we could with some certainty delegate as having been influenced by
unconscious processes. It would be inappropriate, however, to classify the remaining
correct responses as due to purely explicit influences. Regardless of independence or
exclusivity assumptions between implicit or explicit processes, our conservative
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criterion for accepting completions as guessed, probably much like the oppositional
nature of Jacoby's (1991) exclusion task, may underestimate the contribution of
implicit influences. Perhaps more importantly, however, the assumptions of
independence or exclusivity may be unfounded. For example, a different but equally
tenable assumption considers that conscious and unconscious influences be highly
correlated because conscious influences are always associated with corresponding
unconscious antecedents Qoordens & Merikle, 1993). This approach implies that
conscious influences may define a subset of a larger set of unconscious influences, that
happen to be momentarily conscious in order to meet task demands. From a biological
and evolutionary viewpoint, this approach is highly persuasive (e.g., Ornstein, 1991).
It argues for the primacy of unconscious influences at the highest levelsof human
cognition (Lhermitte & Serdaru, 1993; Reber, 1990;1993).
In summary, the analysis-of guessed responses in this study showed that direct
test performance improves by guessing completions of nonsemantically processed
words but does not improve by guessing completions of semantically processed
words. This result points to a fundamental distinction in the experience of a direct test
as a function of whether a word has been deeply processed or minimally processed at
study. These results also contribute to the gradually developing viewpoint that
memory tests are rarely process pure measures (cf.Jacoby, 1991;Jacoby, Lindsay, &
Toth, 1992; Jacoby et al., 1993;see also Joordens & Merikle, 1993). The fact that
guessing may access unconscious information in the same way that an indirect test
does suggests that subjects can be unwittingly resourceful in their capacity to
"remember" information that cannot consciously be retrieved. This conclusion
contrasts with the often implicit assumption that conscious awareness is requisite for
enabling one to act upon and respond to the world (see Ornstein, 1991). Instead,
results from this and other studies encourage the viewpoint that awareness is not
always necessary for eliciting effective or useful behaviour.
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Footnotes
In recentyears, a distinction has beenmadebetween indirecttests subclassified
as perceptual or conceptual (e.g., Weldon, Roediger, &Challis, 1989).
Performanceon perceptual testsis held to depend on perceptual similarity
between study and test stimuli whereasconceptual test performance requires no
such similarity. The present study does not address this distinctionother than
to clarify, first, that theindirect testusedin this study would beclassified as a
perceptual test, and second, thatLOP effects are less likely to be foundfor
perceptual than conceptual tests (Roediger &McDermott, 1993).
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Table 1.
MeanProportion of Correct Completions ofSemanticaily and Nonsemanticallv
Processed Words for the Direct Test of Experiment1 Before and After Removalof
Guessed Data.
Word type
Semantic Nonsemantic Distractor
Retention Test Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Direct
pC .429 .101 .204 .101 .092 .079
cpC .338 .105 .113 .117
Direct - Guesses
pC .396 .089 .067 .078 .004 .014
cpC .392 .089 .063 .078
Note: pC = proportion of correctcompletions; cpC = chance adjusted pC;Direct
Guesses = Direct test performance after removalof guessed responses.
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Table 2.
Mean Proportion of Completions forEach Word Type on the Direct Test in
Experiment 1ThatWere Reported asGuessed, and theProportion ofThese
Completions That Were Also Correct.
pG
pCG
Word Type
Semantic Nonsemantic Distractor
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
.508 .140 .804 .141 .808 .148
.065 .076 .178 .099 .104 .085
Note: pG= proportion ofguessed completions; pCG = proportion ofcorrectly
guessed completions (i.e., proportion ofguessed completions thatwere also correct
divided by pG).
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Table 3.
Mean Proportion of Correct Completions of Semantically and Nonsemantically
Processed Words For Direct and Indirect Tests of Memory in Experiment 2.
Retention Test
Indirect
pc
cpC
Direct
pC
cpC
Word Type
Semantic Nonsemantic Distractor
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
.293 .088 .264 .125 .069 .060
.223 .110 .194 .129
.473 .126 .253 .106 .081 .055
.393 .128 .172 .098
Note: pC = proportion of correct completions; cpC = chance adjusted pC.
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• Semantic
0 Nonsemontic
• Distroctor
Confidence Rating
Figure 1. Frequency of use of each confidence rating for direct test completion of
semantically processed, nonsemantically processed, and distractor words in
Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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Table 4.
Mean Proportion of Completions for Each Word Type on the Direct Test in
Experiment 2 That Were Reported as Guessed, and the Proportion of These
Completions That Were Also Correct.
pG
pCG
Word Type
Semantic Nonsemantic Distractor
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
.339 .176 .611 .229 .698 .230
.016 .036 .133 .126 .061 .067
Note: pG = proportion of guessed completions; pCG = proportion of correctly
guessed completions (i.e.,proportion of guessed completions that were also correct
divided by pG).
